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A B O U T T H E I P T S R E P O R T 
r he IPTS Report was launched in December 1995, on the request and wider the auspices of Commissioner Cresson. What seemed like a daunting challenge in late 1995, now appears m retrospect 
as a crucial galvaniser of the IPTS' energies and skills. 
The Report has published articles in numerous areas, maintaining a rough bafonce between them, and 
exploiting interdisciplinarity asfar as possible. Articles are deemed prospectively relevant if they attempt to 
explore issues not yet on the policymaker's agenda (but projected to be there sooner or later), or 
underappreciated aspects of issues already on the policymaker's agenda. The long drafting and redrafting 
process, based on a series of interactive consultations with outside experts, guarantees qualify control. 
The clearest indication of the report's success is that it is being read. An initial print run of 2000 for the first 
issue (00) in December 1995 looked optimistic at the time, but issue 00 has since turned into a collector's 
item. Tbtal readership rose to around 10,000 in 1997, with readers continuing to be drawn from a variety 
of backgrounds and regions world-wide, and in 1998 a shift in emphasis towards the electronic version on 
the Web has begun. 
The laurels the publication is reaping are rendering it attractive for authors from outside the Commission. 
We have already published contributions by authors from such renowned institutions as the Dutch TNO, the 
German VDI, the Italian ENEA and the US Council of Strategic and International Studies. 
Moreover, the IPTS formally collaborates on the production of the IPTS Report with a group of prestigious 
European institutions, with whom the IPTS has formed the European Science and Technology Observatory 
(ESTO), an important part of the remit of the IPTS. The IPTS Report is the most visible manifestation of this 
collaboration. 
The Report is produced simultaneously in four languages (English, French, German and Spanish) by the 
IPTS; to these one could add the Italian translation volunteered by ENEA: yet another sign of the Report's 
increasing visibility. The fact that it is not only available in sei'eral languages, but also largely prepared and 
produced on the Internet World Wide Web, makes it quite an uncommon undertaking. 
We shall continue to endeavour to find the best way of fulfilling the expectations of our quite diverse 
readership, avoiding oiiersimplification, as well as encyclopaedic reviews and the inaccessibility of academic 
journals. The key is to remind ourselves, as well as the readers, that we cannot be all things to all people, 
that it is important to carve out our niche and continue optimally exploring and exploiting it, hoping to 
illuminate topics under a new, revealing light for the benefit of the readers, in order to prepare them for 
managing the challenges ahead. 
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An introduction to the Futures Project 
2 
J-M C a d i o u , Director, IPTS 
T he Futures Project is a major prospective exercise by the IPTS. It examines the implications of key drivers affecting technology, competitiveness and employ­
ment in Europe to 2010. The drivers operate at 
both European and global level. At the European 
level there are three major economic and political 
drivers. The Euro will become the main currency 
in Europe. The first round of enlargement 
countries will be complete. The single market and 
the associated deregulation of markets will 
continue to consolidate Europe as the wealthiest 
market in the World. On societal drivers, Europe 
faces the particular challenge of demographic 
ageing that will put pressures on the pensions and 
healthcare and will make the retraining of older 
workers an imperative. 
The project also considers three global drivers. 
Two are technological: information and com­
munication technologies (ICTs) and the genetic 
revolution that is transforming the life sciences. 
The third global driver is the environment, which 
without doubt will have a significant impact on 
technology, competitiveness and employment in 
the next decade. 
This special issue of the IPTS Report on 
"Europe in 2010" provides results from the first 
phase of the Futures Project. So far, the project has 
drawn on over 120 experts from industry, 
academia, the Member States and from the 
Commission itself. Each of these experts took part 
in a series of expert panel discussions and in the 
establishment of a series of reports. The panel 
reports examine four of the key global and 
European drivers: Demographic and Social 
Trends; Information and Communication 
Technologies; Life Sciences and the Frontiers of 
Life; and Natural Resources and the Environment. 
In this special issue some key messages from each 
of these panels are highlighted. In addition this 
issue features a paper on enlargement drawn from 
the complementary "Scenarios Europe 2010" 
exercise carried out by the Forward Studies Unit. 
This introduction, meanwhile, provides an 
overview of the Futures Project. It draws upon key 
results from the four panel reports and in so doing 
lays out the main challenges that Europe faces in 
the next ten years. 
Taking first the demographic and societal 
drivers, a defining feature of Europe in 2010 will 
be that its population profile will be significantly 
older than it is today. This will be seen first in the 
workforce, older workers (55-64 year olds) will 
start to out number the younger workers (20-
29 year olds) from about 2007. But the retired 
population is on the rise as well. The average 
retirement age across Europe was until recently 
falling, which means that, with rising life 
expectancies, an average male worker today 
retires with an expectancy of living a further 
8 to 11 years, up from around 2 or 3 years in 
the 1960s. 
Europe's ageing will create pressures on the 
public services, especially healthcare, pensions 
and education. An older population will mean a 
rising bill for care and health services especially 
for those with chronic ailments and for costly end 
of life treatments. Moreover, with the decline in 
the flow of young people entering the workforce, 
there will be a need to substantially reorientate 
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the education and training systems to meet the 
rising demand for retraining. This re-engineering 
will require radical changes in the formal 
education and training sector, but all the 
stakeholders will have to play an active part. 
Employers will have to reinvest in the current 
workforce to a far greater degree than they do at 
present and, correspondingly, older workers 
wil l have to avail themselves of retraining 
opportunities to maintain employability. 
Up to 2010 it is expected that the working 
population will be relatively stable across most of 
Europe, although after then it will decline. This 
stability depends on workers being able to get 
jobs all the way through their working lives, 
which is not always the case nowadays as older 
workers in many countries have high inactivity 
rates. It also requires that trends towards rising 
participation of women in work will continue. In 
fact, the forecasts assume that most of the new 
entrants to the labour market will be women. 
But a steady rise in female participation cannot 
be guaranteed, not least because an emerging 
"Mosaic Society" means that work and living 
patterns are becoming less predictable for 
everyone, but especially women. Boundaries 
between work and life are blurring. Lifetime jobs 
are a thing of the past. Families are being split 
by Increased mobility, the greater economic 
independence of women and rising divorce rates. 
Acting together, these trends mean that the 
customary roles in family and working life can no 
longer be assumed to hold. More parents have to 
juggle responsibilities between work and family. 
There are more single person households and 
single parent families. The Mosaic Society will 
inevitably provoke a profound rethinking of 
social institutions (pensions, unemployment and 
welfare, training and health services) that respond 
to more complex demands from a more varied 
and changing client base. 
Meanwhile, the imperative to reinvest in the 
current working population will be accentuated by 
breathtaking technological changes over 
the next ten years. Technological life cycles are 
shortening all the time, such that a recent 
OECD report suggests a half-life of skills of only 
3.5 years. To keep up, Europe will have to 
continually update the skills of its technology 
specialists and ensure a general dissemination of ICT 
literacy. The ageing of the workforce compounds this 
challenge, enlarging the demand for training while 
simultaneously raising its importance. 
But the signs are that Europe is already not 
"keeping up" with the so-called "digital economy". 
The recent explosive growth of the Internet has 
been constructed almost entirely on United States 
technologies and by US firms such Intel, Microsoft, 
Netscape, Cisco and Sun. Also, around 80% of 
electronic-commerce is currently transacted in 
North America; Europe lags in this area by 
up to 5 years. With potentially large economic 
advantages for the first movers, European firms need 
to identify areas of competitive strength and move 
fast in order to reap the benefits of this new 
information revolution. 
One potential area of European strength, 
emphasised in the ICT Panel Report, is the coming 
wave of "Ubiquitous Computing" - the idea that 
soon computers will be so cheap and 
commonplace that they will be found in 
everything from walls and furniture to clothes. 
Ubiquitous Computing will be based on the 
networking of tiny embedded systems. With 
Moore's Law - which says that circuit complexity 
doubles every year for the same cost - set to 
continue to 2010, low cost "systems on a chip" 
will available for embedding into literally any 
solid surface. These systems will be networked, so 
that they can be controlled and maintained 
remotely. Many will be sensors or actuators, and 
will provide a psychomotor capability to the 
3 
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nervous system of the Internet. Interfaces will also 
change. Keyboards will remain important but 
many devices will be controlled by voice and 
pattern recognition instead. These alternative data 
entry techniques will permit autonomous or 
hands free applications. Computer power will be 
available no matter what the activity whether it is 
driving, walking, running or whatever. The 
implication is an explosion of new devices, 
applications and services. 
This new wave of ICTs heralds an opportunity 
for Europe. Europe already has some world class 
players in relevant industries, such as mobile 
telecommunications, portable computing, 
embedded systems integrators in the automotive 
electronics and consumer electronics. Also, 
ubiquitous computing may be able to avoid 
proprietary lock-ins such as "Wintelism" (Windows 
plus Intel) that dominate standards setting in the 
PC industry. There may simply be too many 
players across too many industries for proprietary 
dominance to take hold. However, to keep the 
game open requires decisive leadership on the part 
of industries and complementary policy efforts. 
Despite the Single Market, there are many 
incompatible administrative, legal and technical 
standards. In the internationally connected 
Information Society, such islands inhibit 
innovation and investment. For example, there are 
currently 22 different smart card standards and 
many different electronic payment systems in 
Europe. No one knows which will succeed, no 
one knows who to trust or how their rights will be 
protected: a recipe for hesitation. It may be time 
for administrations to take some leadership, by 
adopting a "Digital Charter" that commits them to 
doing business on-line, to using common 
standards and to making sure electronic 
commerce is a safe place to do business. The 
weight of public administration in the economy 
alone could thereby provide a strong stimulus to 
investors and innovation. 
Turning now to the area of life sciences, it is 
clear even to a casual observer that here too a 
technological revolution is taking place. In 
medicine, breakthroughs in human genetics could 
transform healthcare practices yielding better and 
more cost-effective treatments. But there will also 
be escalating expectations. Longer lives will create 
widespread demands for effective palliatives for 
chronic conditions, which will undoubtedly be 
endemic in an ageing population. Once again, the 
bottom line will be to redesign health care services 
in order to respond to these changing demands 
and expectations, with the aim of raising quality 
while constraining to the extent possible the 
insistent pressure towards rising costs. 
Meanwhile, the application of new 
biotechnologies in the agrofood sector reveals 
another critical challenge for Europe. Europeans 
seem to be more reluctant than are North 
Americans to accept genetically modified products 
in foodstuffs. This is understandable given that the 
long term health and environmental risks have not 
yet been tested - if indeed such testing is possible. 
However, in the global economy keeping such 
products out is virtually impossible, while slow 
regulatory adaptation may undermine the 
competitive position of European firms. This begs 
a major policy issue: how to satisfy European 
citizens that adequate measures have been taking 
to protect their well being whilst avoiding a loss of 
competitive position in a strategic industrial area. 
One important approach will be to give consumers 
the choice through clear labelling of genetically 
modified products, supported of course by better 
investigation and information about the risks. At 
the very least, the issue calls for a constructive and 
open dialogue between all interested parties, 
industry, biotechnologists, health specialists and 
people at large. 
The European response to global issues also 
figures prominently in the environmental field. 
-IPTS - JRC - Seville, 1999 
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The example of the Kyoto Protocol on the control 
of greenhouse gases throws the different policy 
approaches of Europe and the USA into stark 
relief. Post-Kyoto, the EU has positioned itself as 
the champion of climate protection. It aims to 
show its engagement in the issue by achieving 
much of its C 0 2 emission reduction targets 
domestically. With a move towards cleaner more 
efficient technologies there could be a medium 
term industrial competitive advantage. This 
advantage, however, will only materialise if other 
countries follow path towards domestic 
reductions in C0 2 emissions. But, the emerging 
US position prefers to meet its obligations through 
international cooperation and trade. There are 
substantial cost differences between these 
different routes. Domestic carbon emission 
reductions (the EU approach) are definitely more 
costly than supporting reduction efforts in fast 
industrialising countries (the US approach). The 
basis for this difference is that fast industrialising 
countries such as China and India are expected to 
increase emissions by over 150% to 2020 
(compared to 32% growth in the EU and 38% in 
the USA). In a high growth market there is always 
more scope to install lower emission technology, 
such as new power generating plants to meet the 
new demands. Probably such plantswill be based 
on western technology, yielding an extra gain of 
technology trade. The problem is that unless the 
USA and Japan also follow the EU emphasis on 
achieving carbon emission reductions at home, 
the competitive position of Europe could be 
harmed by rising costs for producers and higher 
prices for consumers. 
The carbon gas example illustrates a general 
challenge of globalisation. There will be conflicts 
of interest, because there are different attitudes 
between the players. Europe generally adopts a 
precautionary principle - i.e. if in doubt abstain. 
The US, and the WTO, position is the reverse - if 
in doubt -proceed. Globalisation, moreover, 
transforms these bilateral contrasts into 
multilateral complexities, yielding recurring 
conflicts and deadlock. But such is globalisation, 
and Europe has to fully engage itself into the 
process in order to take a strong part in shaping 
the future. 
European enlargement will reinforce Europe's 
role as a key shaper of the global economy. 
Certainly, acceptance into the first round of 
enlargement seems to have attracted foreign direct 
investment in Eastern Europe. But these flows will 
continue only if the infrastructures are brought up 
to standard and a stable and predictable 
investment environment is maintained. The 
challenge of enlargement is huge but it is 
fundamental to Europe's future. With the end of the 
cold war the EU is the lead player in a much larger 
"neighbourhood". This brings responsibilities to 
help stabilise the region, as the recent war in the 
ex-Yugoslavia indicates. It also brings advantages. 
Europe stands to become by far the largest bloc of 
advanced democratic economies. 
The different trends, challenges and 
opportunities identified in the Futures Project are 
unlikely to come separately or at a sedate pace. 
The rising costs of maintaining the core social 
systems (pensions, health and unemployment 
support) will have to be met just at the time when 
the number of social security contributors in the 
active population ceases to grow and then starts to 
fall. Tremendous pressures will have built up to 
force a shake out in Europe's overly rigid 
education and training systems. And if Europe 
aims to stay in the vanguard of technological 
innovation and competitiveness it will have to re-
engineer this sector. Elsewhere, European industry 
will be facing a large bill to mitigate C0 2 
emissions. Meanwhile, the initial costs of 
enlargement will fall due - even if in the long-term 
the prospect is greater wealth and influence for 
Europe as a whole. 
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There is a further demon in the box. Faced 
with all these pressures on the social systems, 
Europeans may decide to defer consumption in 
favour of saving, for fear of future gaps in social 
provision. If many of them start to hold large 
liquid reserves to cover pensions, illnesses or 
periods of unemployment, there may be a danger 
that a lack of demand could tip Europe into 
recession. A less extreme consequence of low 
consumer confidence could be to reduce 
spending on consumer electronics and media thus 
stifling or delaying the next wave of the 
Information Revolution. 
Some of these drivers, particularly demographic 
ageing, will hit the EU much harder than the USA. 
All the more reason, then, In a world of global 
competition, for Europe to move quickly and surely 
if it aims to stay at the heart of the action. In the 
global game, dynamic and innovative players tend 
to win out. Europe will have to overcome its natural 
cautiousness, if we are not to miss the boat in areas 
such as embedded systems when first movers stand 
to take the lion's share of the winnings. 
On the other hand, we cannot afford to throw 
away all the special features that distinguish 
Europe from its competitors - the cultural 
diversity, the commitment to socially balanced 
growth, the tradition of progress by consensus. 
Fast and loose could become fast and lose. 
Structural and institutional reforms are needed, 
especially in areas such as education, health and 
pensions. But the solutions should also be 
effective and long lasting. They should capitalise 
on emerging growth areas by building on 
Europe's existing strengths such as Europe's 
technological excellence, its cultural richness 
and its social cohesion. The window of 
opportunity is open. Action has to be fast, but 
with the long view of building institutions and 
solutions for the next century. 
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The Learning imperative for Europe's 
Ageing workforce 
James P. Cavigan, IPTS 
issue: Europe's ageing workforce Is characterized by high rates of age-biased skills and 
knowledge deficits, with concomitantly high inactivity and unemployment rates. As the 
proportion of the older working-age cohorts rises (there will be more 55-64 year-olds 
than 15-24 year-olds after 2007), maximizing their employment rates and productivity will 
be vital to ensure a sustainable functioning of the economy. 
Relevance: A system which continues to be dominated by front-end education and 
training - pending the advent of true 'lifelong learning' - will be incapable of 
guaranteeing the continued employablllty and rising productivity of an ageing 
workforce. Recent trends encouraging earlier retirement have delayed recognition of 
this Issue. EU-wlde shock-therapy Is needed, joining public and private efforts, to involve 
the middle to upper age cohorts in appropriate continuous learning up-skilllng while 
there is still some time. 
The Main Story Line 
L eaving aside important national and regional differences, Europe's population is ageing considerably due to the well-documented decline in fertility in the 
second half of the twentieth century. One key 
component of this with immediate short-term 
policy implications is the ageing of the working-
age population - i.e. the 16 to 64 age cohort. 
The imminent inversion of the age pyra­
mid shown in Figure 1 raises several questions 
regarding the adequacy of the knowledge and 
skills profile, as well as learning competence, of 
a work force which traditionally has been 
strongly biased in favour of youth. Previously, 
renewal of the knowledge and skills pool was 
provided by a growing swell of incoming 
young workers with up-to-date knowledge and 
training, and overall macro-economic conditions 
which made it possible and affordable to 
encourage early retirement for older workers 
whose skills were apparently no longer useful. 
However, this is no longer sustainable for a 
number of reasons: 
1. Demographic ageing combined with a static 
or low population growth places strains on the 
active population to support a growing cohort of 
retired citizens. To ease the growing dependency 
rates, workers should defer retirement and 
underused labour reserves, especially women 
should be activated. 
2. Rapid obsolescence of skills, the 3.5-year 
half-life of most work place skills1, calls for almost 
continuous retraining. 
λ 
In the past an ample 
supply of young 
workers made it 
possible for firms to 
update skills by simply 
replacing older workers 
with more recently 
trained younger ones. 
Demographic ageing 
will make this 
unsustainable 
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o fi 
Early retirement of 
older workers whose 
skills were considered 
outmoded has often 
resulted in a loss of 
tacit knowledge by 
their former employers 
The challenge is to 
engineer a compiete 
overhaul of the 
education and training 
culture, institutions and 
mechanisms so as to 
ensure that continuous 
learning becomes an 
integral part of 
people's lives 
Figure 1. Age groups 15-24 and 55-64 as % of age group 15-64 - EUR 15 -1995-2025 
24 
23 
22 
21 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
15 
14 
15-24 age group 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2010 2020 2025 
Source: Eurostat 1997 Demographic Projections (baseline scenario); C. Coomans, Europe's 
Changing Demography - Constraints & Bottlenecks, IPTS Futures Report Series No.8,1999. 
3. For the youth cohorts, the school-to-work 
transition is increasingly problematic, with a lack 
of relevance of formal education to demanded 
work skills. There is an increased gap between 
skills demanded in the labour market and 
revisions in the curricula. 
4. Against the misconception of older workers as 
a drag on productivity, research results point to the 
value of the experience and tacit knowledge 
embodied in older workers. Retaining experienced 
workers and better knowledge transfer can yield 
gains. Early retirement can result in the loss of 
knowledge assets that took years to accumulate. 
The short-term imperative is to up-skill and 
retrain all, especially older, workers, noting that 
this is just one, albeit essential, dimension to 
managing an ageing workforce2. 
In the medium-to-long term, the challenge is a 
complete overhaul of the education and training 
culture, institutions and mechanisms. Continuous 
learning from the cradle to the grave should be 
reflected in all economic and social institutions -
from private, public, cooperative to community 
levels. Such a desirable situation can be termed 
Lifelong AND Life-wide Learning. 
Box 1. Adult Skills and Literacy Predicament 
The half-life of most worker skills is 3.5 years 
(OECD, 1998) 
80 % of all technology will be replaced in the coming decade 
(DGV, 1998) 
One third to half of 25-64 year olds have less than adequate literacy levels for today's 
work and living requirements 
(OECD - Human Capital Investment, 1998) 
We become technologically obsolete every 5 years and need retraining 
(S. Rush - IBM's Global Education Industry general manager, 1999) 
ι IPTS-JRC -Seville, 1999 
N O . 3 8 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 9 T h e I P T S R e p o r t 
Figure 2. Age pyramid - EU15 and Agenda 2000 countries -1995-2010 
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A significant proportion 
of workers probably 
rarely receive any 
organized training, and 
participation is biased 
toward those with 
higher levels of initial 
educational attainment 
Figure 3. Participation in education and training over the life-span -
unweighted mean for nine countries 
100 
DC 
C 
O 
α. 
οβ 
- * - Formal Education Enrollment (3-29), 1995 
-~- Adult Education & Training Participation, 1994-95 
3-5 6-7 8-12 13-15 16-18 19-21 22-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-65 
Age Groups 
* Note: the countries shown are Belgium, Ireland. Canada. Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US, 
1994 - 1995. The first line gives the enrolment in formal education; the second line gives the proportion of adults undergoing 
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Source: OECD 1998, Education Policy Analysis. 
We are far from this at present, even simply in 
terms of measurable participation rates (let alone 
some measure of quality and relevance) in some 
form of organized learning activities over the 
different age groups (see Figure 3). Worse still, 
the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) 
results, which take a complex measure of adult 
literacy, suggest that very large segments of the 
adult population are under-equipped in very 
basic 'instrumental' numeracy and literacy skills 
- see Table I. 
Furthermore, as older workers are generally 
less likely to participate in job-related training, 
they would have higher barriers to overcome 
should they be confronted late in their career with 
the need to engage in instructor-led structured 
learning or training. This makes the short-term 
challenge even more daunting. 
What can be done? 
Resource-wise, one can conjecture how it 
might be possible to increase worker-participation 
in job-related training up to an adequate level, 
and who would pay for the direct and opportunity 
costs incurred. 
Figure 3 shows that more than two-thirds of 
the population do not participate in organized 
learning each year. Of course, if informal learning 
is included, the non-participation rate would be 
lower. Nonetheless, a significant proportion of 
workers seem to receive barely any organised 
training over their working lives, especially those 
with lower educational attainment. 
Furthermore, little or no information is 
available on the quality and effectiveness of on-
the-job training offered by firms or public labour 
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Table 1. Percentage adults (age 16-65) performing below an adequate 
threshold of literacy3,1994-95 
Poland 
76.1 
Ireland 
57 
New United 
Zealand Kingdom 
50.6 50.4 
United 
States 
49.6 
Switzer-
land 
46 
Australia Canada 
44.9 42.9 
Germany Belgium 
41.7 39.6 
Nether-
lands 
35.9 
Sweden 
25.1 
market programmes. It's almost certainly the case 
that a significant proportion of job-related training 
could be more cost efficient. Also other areas of 
human resource or employment spending could 
be reorientated to give a greater training or 
learning mission. 
In public policy terms this could entail a 
detailed appraisal and overhaul of all training 
actions in Active Labour Market policies to 
raise effectiveness. Other active labour market 
policy instruments (job-creation, job subsidies 
to employers, public service job-brokerage) 
could be designed to include an obligatory 
individualized training dimension. Going still 
further into the other areas of labour market policy 
including taxation and income support benefits, 
perhaps these could also function as further 
instruments and incentives for individuals to 
engage in learning activities and for employers to 
offer more and better training4. Versions of 
'workfare' whereby benefit recipients are 
remunerated in exchange working in firms, the 
community or taking training, are operational in 
Canada, Switzerland, Norway, the UK and the 
US. Perhaps the take up of workfare could be 
widened and given a new twist by accentuating 
the training dimension - i.e. 'trainfare' or 'learn-
and-earn'. 
In the private domain, the emergence of a 
knowledge economy founded on intangible rather 
than tangible assets is leading to a reappraisal of 
the value of human capital over fixed capital and 
technological artefacts. It is important that 
business investment patterns reflect this new 
reality, and that entrepreneurs, private business 
strategists and employers in general invest more in 
people5. This in essence means the development 
of employee skills and competencies. Clearly this 
requires a new sort of outlook within businesses, 
which means that there is a prerequisite on these 
stakeholders themselves to make a learning 
transition towards understanding the new 
economic 'rules of the game'. Obviously, public 
policy can facilitate this by providing favourable 
legislative and regulatory framework conditions 
for it to come about. 
Scandinavia takes the lead? 
As in many areas, the training situation is not 
homogeneous across Europe. However, amidst all 
the variation, the Scandinavian countries stand 
out on a number of counts. Firstly, in different 
labour force surveys, the recorded rates of 
participation in job-related training are 
consistently higher than elsewhere in Europe6. 
Sweden, in particular is anomalous with regard to 
the age-dependence of the training-participation 
rate, with a relatively even spread over different 
age brackets, compared to a steady decline of 
participation rates with age for the EU as a whole. 
In fact, the highest job-related training 
participation rate (20 %) in Sweden is for 40-49 
year-olds, while over 59 year-olds at 10 % is over 
five times the EU15 average! Furthermore, activity 
rates for over 55 age-cohorts are around twice or 
more the EU15 average, with correspondingly 
lower unemployment rates. 
A number of countries 
are experimenting with 
so-called "workfare" 
schemes which include 
training on the list of 
activities for which 
benefit recipients can 
be remunerated 
Job-related training 
participation is higher 
in Scandinavia than 
elsewhere in Europe 
and training is spread 
more evenly between 
age groups, although 
this may be related to 
the fact they are facing 
demographic changes 
earlier than the 
rest of Europe 
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Although some 
individuals may 
welcome the 
opportunity to 
continue earning and 
contributing to society, 
raising the retirement 
age may be viewed by 
many as taking away a 
sacrosanct and well­
earned right 
Table 2. Activity and Unemployment Rates for 55-59 year olds compared for 
EU15 and Sweden 
Males+Females 
Males 
Females 
Activity Rate 55-59 years 
EU15 
55.2 
68.6 
42.0 
Sweden 
80.4 
84.4 
76.4 
Unemployment Rate 55-59 years 
EU15 
10.8 
10.5 
11.4 
Sweden 
7.5 
9.3 
5.5 
Source: Labour Force Survey Results 1997, Eurostat 1998. 
Table 3. Total (public & private) and public spending on formal (initial) 
education and training (1994), and public spending on labour market 
training programmes LMT 1995 not including measures for youth and 
the disabled, as percentage of GDP 
Total 
Public 
LMT 
Sweden 
9 
6.6 
0.7 
Den­ Fin­
mark land 
8.4 8 
6.6 6.6 
1.47 0.58 
Nor, 
way 
-
6.8 
0.61 
: France] Hun­ Spain Ireland Ger­.Nether­ Por­ Czech Austria Bel­
gary | many ι lands tugal Rep. giuni 
6.7 6.5 6.4 6 6 6 5.7 ­ 5.6 
5.6 5.7 4.8 5.2 4.5 4.7 5.3 5.7 5.4 5.5 
0.5 0.13 0.41 0.43 0.56 0.22 0.39 0.02 0.16 0.32 
UK. Italy Greece 
­ 4.8 ­
4.9 4.7 3.1 
0.1 0.3 0.09 
The figures for expenditure on both formal and 
labour­market­driven education and training in 
different countries, also show consistently higher 
levels for Scandinavia (see Table 3), suggesting 
some systemic reasons for the above statistics. 
All of this does not necessarily mean that 
Sweden constitutes a best­ practice benchmark 
that should be imitated in other parts of the EU. 
There is undoubted value in taking a close look at 
the "hows and whys" of the systemic differences 
and relative successes across the EU, but it should 
not be done blindly. 
Firstly, with a relatively old working­age 
population Sweden and Finland had to grapple the 
ageing workforce problem earlier than others. 
Secondly, the sustainability of some Active Labour 
Market policies can be questioned, for example a 
Danish educational leave scheme was so popular 
that it led to labour shortages and required stricter 
eligibility criteria and a reduction in scope7. 
Furthermore, strong national path­
dependent cultural and institutional idiosyn­
crasies often mean that attempts to transfer 
'best practices' are doomed to failure. However, 
'means' should be distinguished from 'ends'. 
Outcomes can often be achieved by different, 
but 'functionally equivalent', policies and 
actions. 
Broadening the Perspective 
The main story line underscores the urgency 
of maximizing the participation and skills 
level of the working­age population over 
their full active life on the basis of 
straightforward but potent demographic and 
other quantifiable facts. To interpret this from 
a realistic policy­making perspective, the 
message needs to be complemented with 
some other considerations that are inextricably 
linked to the main labour­force training 
message. 
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Unemployment 
Firstly, to call for urgent policy to counter a 
forthcoming short­fall in adequate labour supply at 
a time of unemployment, may seem strange. 
However, labour scarcity does not exclude 
unemployment, because market­ and competition­
driven business cycles operate on a different time 
scale to demographic processes. Policy can play 
intelligently with these different time scales. For 
example, the baby boomer generation could still 
rapidly adapt to continuous­learning, which 
would better prepare and also favourably dispose 
them to seeing out their full working life. By 
contrast focusing on the top age cohort might be 
difficult ­ too little, too late! 
Immigration 
Relaxing immigration controls may be a 
necessary way to proceed in the future, but is 
unlikely to be a solution in the short­term. The 
average skills­levels are rising, and key labour­
shortages are mainly for high­skilled workers. For 
this reason, the US is already following a selective 
immigration policy8. For the EU such measures 
might be counter­productive in the long run. 
Europe and its neighbours may gain if skilled 
people stay at home to participate in developing 
their own economies, rather than depriving them 
of the critical assets of knowledge and skills. 
Extended working life vs. retirement 
What psychological effects result from an 
extension of working life beyond the expected 
retirement age? For some workers the prospects of 
retirement can be a traumatic experience when 
the follow­on is a void. For others, the retirement 
may signal a fall in income and living 
standards9. However, for many, a comfortable and 
economically autonomous retirement from 60 to 
64 is sacrosanct and to interfere with it amounts to 
betrayal of the social contract between individuals 
and the institutional framework. Nonetheless, the 
macro­economic realities call for a re­evaluation of 
social need and social responsibility across the 
generations. This may be hard to achieve given the 
increasing political voice of an ageing population. 
The authors of change 
The baby boomer generation at the centre of 
the demographic time bomb is renowned for 
rewriting the rules as it progresses through life ­
from the counter culture of the 1960s­70s to 
the institutional reforms of the 1980s­90s. With 
the need to find a new balance of social 
responsibility and cost­coverage this generation 
may in turn reinvent old age and retirement, 
building on ideas such as semi­retirement and 
work arrangements, in flexible formats which 
accommodate individual choice and preferences. 
Much innovation in public policy, business, civil 
society and people's mind sets is needed, but the 
baby boomers might be the right generation to 
bring it about. 
work. Employment and welfare 
It is possible that the collective responses to 
the learning/ageing­labour­market predicament 
might spell a break with the present centrality of 
'market work' as the main source of economic 
and social well­being. As the cohort of nominally 
'old' people increases, so too does distribution of 
wealth in society. Redistribution issues are 
critical. For example, poverty is less associated 
now with old­age and more with new 
disadvantaged groups such as single (teenage) 
parents, unemployed youths, low educational 
achievers. 
Meanwhile, older people constitute emerging 
markets in housing, amenities, health, personal 
care and leisure Much of the growth will be in 
the so­called "social economy". The continuing 
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Although it may seem 
strange to call for 
policy action to address 
a future shortage of 
suitably trained labour 
at a time when 
unemployment Is high, 
It is justified by the 
differing time­
constants of the 
anderling processes 
Selective immigration 
from countries around 
the EU may exacerbate 
existing skills shortages 
In the countries 
concerned and so limit 
their growth potential 
Many commentators 
advance the Idea of the 
need for more 
generalized flexible 
semi­retirement/work 
arrangements, 
together with changes 
in working patterns 
to allow greater 
access to training 
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Tomorrow's relatively 
affluent old-people will 
drive growth in the 
so-called 'social 
economy', and 
perhaps also 
participate by 
working in it 
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decline of jobs requiring physical strength and 
motor skills may suit an ageing workforce. 
Perhaps also jobs where experience counts such 
as certain caring roles could be reserved for 
older workers, so as to allow a move out of the 
economy into the 'social' economy of 
mentoring, caring, community service, public 
service, teaching or childminding. 
Conclusion 
The broader mix of short, medium and longer-
term issues just considered, if anything, reinforce 
the main message. Public and private decision-
makers must take steps towards active upskilling 
of the ageing workforce, in the interests of 
ensuring viable well-being for all in the medium 
to long term, ^ f 
Keywords 
demographic ageing, skills, learning, labour market policy 
Notes 
1- OECD Working Papers 1998, Vol. VI, No. 21 Policy Implications of Ageing Societies. 
2- For a broader discussion of good practice in managing an ageing workforce see the published results 
of the research project Combating Age Barriers in Employment by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (http://www.eurofound.ie/) 
3- Literacy skills v/ere identified to cover demands in the home, at work and in the community. Three 
domains were used - Prose Literacy (understand and use information from newspapers, fiction and 
expository text); Document literacy (knowledge and skills to locate and use information in official forms, 
timetables, maps and charts); Quantitative literacy (knowledge and skills to apply mathematical 
operations in printed materials) - with five levels of difficulty for each literacy domain. The threshold 
level of adequate literacy was deemed to be level three on the five point scale. Scores of two and one 
were considered to be below threshold. 
4- A November 1998 DG V Report Managing Change by the Gyllenhammar High Level Group on 
Economic and Social Implications of Industrial Change, in relation to employability, lifelong education 
and training recommended that labour market policy and education policy be more closely co-
ordinated and, ¡f possible, be implemented 'from one source'. 
5- A recent American Society for Training & Development survey found a high correlation between high 
spending on training per employee and company performance measured in net sales and gross profits per 
employee. Leading edge firms spend more than three times what average firms spend on employee training 
($2000 vs. $650 per annum), the rate of increase in spending is also twice as high + $300 vs. +$150 from 
1996 to '97 (http://www.astd.org/CMS/templates/index.html?template_id=1&articIeid=20940) 
6- E.g. the 1996 Eurostat Labour Force Survey found an EU 15 average of 3.6 % of over 30 year-olds took 
part in a training course in the four weeks prior to the survey date while the figures for Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden were 11.8 %, 10.7 % and 11.7 %. The OECD-CERI's Human Capital Investment 1998 report 
generally concurs with this. 
7- When paid-leave schemes (including parental, educational and sabbatical leave) were expanded in 
1994 they became so oversubscribed that labour shortages resulted in some sectors. After peaking at 
80,000 persons in 1995, access was brought down to about 40,000 in 1998. See Jens Lind 
http://www.socsci.auc.dk/~jlind/tekster/oslo.htm and OECD's Economic Survey of Denmark 1999. 
'IPTS - JRC - Seville, 1999 
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8- See Legal Immigration, Fiscal Year 1997, US Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, January 1999 (http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/stats/index.html) 
9- 40 % of early retirees regard their labour market exit as primarily involuntary, European Commission 
COM(1999)221. 
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The fast-growing 
markets for 'small 
footprint' non-PC 
systems include 
personal digital 
assistants, mobile 
phones, smart cards, 
embedded networks 
In vehicles and even 
chips embedded in 
pharmaceuticals 
Ubiquitous Computing: the New 
industrial Challenge 
Ken Ducatel , IPTS 
issue: A new transition in the information revolution seems imminent in which 
computers will move from being pervasive to 'ubiquitous'. All sorts of everyday devices -
such as walls, doors, consumer appliances and clothing - are expected to be 
computerized, networked and made intelligent. Ubiquitous computing implies a new 
infrastructure for living and the emergence of new industries. 
Relevance: Ubiquitous computing signals changes In business models in both 
technology (ICT and consumer electronics) industries and traditional Industries, 
innovation and industrial policies can respond by raising awareness, focusing on 
technological bottlenecks and keeping application protocols open. 
The transition to ubiquitous computing 
M oore's Law', the most famous of computer industry axioms, is widely expected to hold at least until 2010, with a strong expectation that the cost 
of manufacturing a "system on a chip" computers 
(including input and output controllers) will fall to 
a few cents. Chips are expected to be cheap 
enough for them to be considered as 
"disposable". The low cost and almost invisible 
nature of these chips will permit chips to be 
embedded in all sorts of artefacts and devices that 
today are not computerized (clothes and furniture, 
for example). Indeed, the embedding of chips into 
the backdrop of daily life is expected to usher in 
the era of "ubiquitous computing". 
Although computers, those most conspicuous 
of computer devices still drive the semiconductor 
business (see Table 1 ), we can already see strong 
signals of the trend towards ubiquitous 
computing. The current fast growth markets for 
'small footprint' non-PC systems include personal 
digital assistants, mobile phones, smart cards, 
embedded networks in cars and even chips 
embedded in pharmaceuticals. In the near future 
non-PC devices are expected to include set-top 
TVs, interactive, 'magic glasses' for portable 
information display, and computers embedded in 
clothing particularly for special purposes, such as 
monitoring the physical condition of sports 
people or out-patients, tracking workers in 
hazardous occupations or environments and 
battlefield information systems for soldiers. 
Actually, invisible computer chips already 
surround us. A few years ago Andy Grove, current 
Chairman of Intel, could already claim that the 
average American encounters 70 microprocessors 
IPTS-JRC -Seville, 1999 
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Box 1. The intuitive interface 
Inputs: 
Keyboards will be around for a long time to come, but speech and handwriting recognition systems for 
data entry will grow in importance. Direct input based from image analysis and environmental sensors 
that detect and analyse ambient information from electronic tags, bar codes, biosensors, visual 
information or smell will be grow in importance. Key advances will be algorithms for image and speech 
analysis and compression By 2010wide availability is expected of speech activated computing in all sorts 
of devices; cheap transcription devices; and the widespread replacement of human operators for speech 
activated devices. 
Displays: 
Cathode Ray Tubes (CRT) will provide higher definition and remain a major technology for desktop 
displays and televisions, but Liquid Crystal Displays (LCD) will grow very fast especially in 
mobile/portable applications. For example Active Matrix LCDs in vehicles and for personal digital 
assistants and wearable computers or 'Magic Glasses' using ferro-electric liquid crystal Spatial Light 
Modulators. Other technologies include: mirror displays (arrays of thousands of tiny mirrors reflecting red, 
green or blue light; flexible light emitting displays, rear projection of images). 
Source: Ducatel, K., Burgelman, J-C, Howells, J., Ottisch, M. and Bohlin, E. (1999). 
Information and Communication and Information Society, Futures Project Report 03, 
IPTS, Seville. 
each day before lunch. These chips are mainly in 
the home, in domestic appliances and consumer 
electronics; in the fixtures and fittings of public 
spaces, such as elevators and security systems; and 
especially in vehicles and traffic control systems. 
However, ubiquitous computing is likely to be 
built using devices that offer more than today's 
embedded chips: 
• Ubiquity - integrated circuits are likely to be 
found in a wide variety of products and will 
affect virtually all industrial sectors. (Will 
wearable computers be products of the 
computer industry, consumer electronics or 
fashion clothing?) 
• These devices will 'think' - the complexity will 
be on the inside not (like today's PCs) in the 
user's (inter)face.2 This implies the need for 
very good design engineering skills (a possible 
European competitive strength - see the article 
on "Competitive Complex Systems" in issue 19 
of The IPTS Report) and for robust systems that 
we can trust (unlike today's cumbersome 
desktop PCs). 
• These devices will talk to each other - today's 
hardwired embedded chips are increasingly 
operating in local networks and already there 
are trends towards linking them to external 
network control for updating, maintenance 
and control. 
The Industrial Challenge of Ubiquitous 
Computing 
Ubiquitous computing raises important 
technological and competitiveness challenges for 
Europe. On the technological front, there are many 
emerging areas of development that will still be 
avant-garde, even in 2010, especially in areas 
such as pattern recognition, tactile interfaces 
(not just the look but the feel of shaking hands 
in a video meeting) and artificial intelligence 
techniques (see Box 1 ). Keeping abreast of the very 
rapid technological advances in these areas will 
call for major on-going investments in new 
technologies. However, one of the key features of 
Ubiquitous Computing will be the way that it will 
call for the capacity to integrate different 
technological trajectories, i.e. different types of 
17 
Ubiquitous computing 
is likely to be built on 
embedded systems 
which are robust, user-
friendly and readily 
linked Into networks 
New microsystems and 
systems integration 
industries will emerge, 
embedding these chips 
into consumer 
electronics and all 
sorts of new devices 
and products 
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The automobile 
industry has been 
among the first to take 
up ubiquitous 
computing. It has now 
already begun to move 
from independent 
electronic control 
systems to a 
networked approach, 
turning the car 
into an information 
and media hub 
Although the 
dynamics of the 
home automation 
market are not as 
favourable as those of 
the automotive 
industry, there are an 
increasing number of 
networks in homes and 
more integration is 
likely In the future 
Table 1. Forecasted of Growth Rates for Selected Electronics Productions 
Market 
Product area Value 
(Meuro) 
Growth 
(average annual growth) 
1997 \Ψ)7-Ψ) 1997-01 
Complete computer systems 
ICs and semiconductors 
Control and instrumentation 
Consumer electronics 
Telecommunications 
Auto electronics 
Medical equipment 
Industrial equipment 
31470 
21800 
21586 
17995 
21867 
4484 
3814 
3479 
4.38 3.48 
-0.92 4.40 
1.72 1.69 
3.27 2.45 
0.64 -0.48 
7.30 
5.23 
2.67 
5.89 
4.55 
1.84 
Production 
Value Growth 
(Meuro) (average 
annual growth) 
27539 5.02 
10876 -1.00 
24885 2.17 
12820 0.95 
25536 
No data 
5044 
3216 
1.96 
No data 
5.08 
2.31 
Source: Reed Electronics Research: Yearbook of Electronics Data 1999. 
hardware (ICs, displays, sensors, sound and vision 
systems) and software systems (controllers, 
decision systems, software agents). 
The effect will be to create new microsystems 
and systems integration industries devoted to 
embedding these chips into consumer and 
automotive electronics and all sorts of new devices 
and products.3 We can see these developments 
very clearly in the area of automobiles, which is 
probably the area in which ubiquitous computing 
has had the greatest impact. As Table 1 showed, in 
the automotive sector there is an expectation of 
very fast growth in the application of electronics of 
around 7% per annum over the next four years. 
Annual growth rates will be even higher in certain 
product areas such as suspension control (49%), 
steering (37%), multiplexing (33%) and 
transmissions (27%)4. Until now the evolution of 
automotive electronics has followed the trend 
for electronics to substitute for mechanical, 
electromechanical, hydraulic and manual control 
in sub-systems such as braking, power train, 
engine, suspension, gearing and climate control. 
The high growth of multiplexing reflects a probable 
trend away from separate and isolated control 
systems (which has lead to a proliferation of 
computer systems) towards a single optical fibre 
network which handles these control systems and 
the increasing demand that the car operate as an 
information and media hub. Automotive markets 
are dominated by a relatively small number of large 
systems integrators in which the European firms 
Bosch and Valeo are well placed alongside US 
(Delphi and Visteon) and Japanese (Denso) firms. 
The automotive electronics example clearly 
shows the importance of the systems integration 
role in integrating different technologies into a 
reliable and coherent system. However, 
automotive electronics is also a special case. A car 
is relatively "high ticket" consumer purchase with 
a reasonably large margin for experimentation 
and a pathway towards economies of scale 
as electronic equipment trickles down to 
cheaper models. Development relations are 
relatively direct: systems integrators work directly 
with a single final assembler in designing and 
implementing systems. Safety critical technologies 
(e.g. braking) have isolated car electronics from 
the mainstream computer industry, but this is 
changing with the sharing or' platforms for driver 
information systems, and vehicle control systems. 
As with cars, the evolution of the smart home 
has taken the form of a series of stand-alone 
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appliances or specialized networks (such as 
heating or security systems). But, so far no 
effective system integrators have emerged. 
Instead there is considerable competition from 
different quarters to define the appropriate 
standards. This is not for want of potential 
standards, each industry sector and major world 
market seems to have its own approach. For 
example, European actors have recently agreed 
to achieve convergence between the installer 
industry standards (EIB and BATIBUS) and that of 
the Consumer Electronics Sector (EHS), however 
there remain significant practical interoperability 
problems and it seems that the computer 
industry standard LONWorks might actually 
emerge as the de facto standard - and this just at 
European level5. 
Home system integration is neither as strong 
nor as effective as in the car. There is a lack of 
consumer demand for networked appliances -
people are happy with single function standalone 
appliances and do not need or want integrated or 
on-line control functions. The lack of current 
usage points to a lack of usability and 
functionality in the interface designs, rather than 
fundamental lack of demand. Most homes do 
have increasing numbers of networks and there 
may be gains from integrating them. Also, home 
web cameras and small-scale sensors and 
actuators, all of which require networks, are also 
likely to proliferate in the household in the 
coming years. 
There is also a cost and hassle barrier. Homes 
have much longer investment cycles than cars, 
thus the issue of retrofitting is more salient. The 
cost and mess of rewiring a house is prohibitive. 
There are technical proposals to resolve the 
retrofitting problem: wireless home networks or 
piggy backing on the existing power circuits. Here 
again, though, there is the problem of competing 
and incompatible solutions. 
By contrast to home automation, portable 
intelligence is a runaway successes - especially 
mobile phones, hand held computers and 
personal digital assistants. Here albeit at a micro-
scale, system integration is fundamental. Each 
device combines a complex range of fast evolving 
technologies: liquid crystal displays, lightweight 
batteries, communication capacities as well as 
software, processing and storage. Furthermore 
with wearable computers there will be demands 
for voice recognition and activation for hands-free 
operation. 
New industrial horizons 
A stock taking exercise of ubiquitous 
computing is sorely needed to provide the basis 
for awareness raising and innovation support to 
help European industry prepare for Ubiquitous 
Computing. Areas of emphasis could include 
prospects for: 
• Emerging systems integration industries, 
especially in existing areas of strength such as 
specialized circuit design, middleware, 
knowledge representation and mobile and 
personal digital devices. 
• Design and engineering of 'intuitive interfaces' 
using flat displays, speech and natural language 
recognition, vision systems and ergonomics. 
Growing demand for software engineering will 
provide many opportunities for European 
producers. 
• The consequences for traditional industrial 
fields (from mechanical engineering, through 
construction to textiles), which could also 
experience new added value creation as a 
result of embedded computing. 
The main policy aim the stocktaking exercise 
would be awareness raising of the industrial 
opportunities and challenges of Ubiquitous 
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Computing. There are potentially very large new 
markets in these sectors for European firms, 
notably as systems integration and in consumer 
electronics and telecommunications. 
Anticipating industrial structure changes will 
also be important. For example, the automotive 
components industry has already seen a massive 
rationalization due to re­engineering and 
downsizing, and the replacement of sub­
assembly components by semiconductors. 
Policy leadership might also aid firms in 
traditional branches to act upon opportunities to 
add value through ubiquitous computing 
applications thus improving competitiveness. 
Open or Proprietary Models? 
A second concern about Ubiquitous 
Computing relates to the possible emergence of 
dominant proprietary systems. With rising 
interoperability, current embedded chip systems 
will move from custom towards standardized 
operating systems. This will yield economies of 
scale, increase access to plug­in software, ease 
the training of developers and operators and 
allow remote monitoring of embedded systems. 
The automotive industry in Europe seems to 
be quite well placed. With "smart homes", the 
high penetration of computers and the Internet 
in the US households implies amore rapid 
growth of non­PC network devices (IDC projects 
that 12 million US homes (12%) will have home 
networks by 2002)6. European producers will 
have to compete with resulting first mover 
advantages for the US home systems integrators 
and protocol setting firms. Contending as the 
industry standard of small footprint operating 
systems for home and mobile devices are 
Windows CE (not yet small and agile enough but 
offering Internet access and a familiar interface), 
Sun's Java language and EPOC (from the 
Symbian consortium of Psion, Nokia, Ericsson 
and Motorola). 
It is not by chance that Java is included in the 
recent prototype "Network Vehicle" showcased 
by Delphi Automotive, IBM, Sun Microsystems 
and Netscape. It has many advantages. It is 
platform independent and can be written and sent 
over the Internet (making remote control and 
maintenance easier). In other words it implies that 
ubiquitous computing could develop to be 
independent of the physical platform and of the 
operating system. However, it may also be that de 
facto proprietary standards are established. The 
obvious parallel is the case of the desktop PC 
industry, where a few firms have captured the 
design and development paradigms, and so 
dictate the pace of and direction of change.7 
There are alternatives to proprietary 
dominance, one is to agree memorandums of 
agreement, such as that on digital mobile 
telephony . Another approach is open source 
standards (such as Linux) which permits an open 
professional developer community to evolve new 
systems rapidly and relatively robustly. 
Ubiquitous computing will introduce new 
interests into the computing industry, from 
consumer appliance to building control system 
manufacturers (such as heating, lighting, lifts or 
security systems). These firms will offer products 
and 'content' in the form of new telematic 
services, such as remote monitoring and 
maintenance of Internet appliances. The sheer 
variety of actors, applications and services implies 
that no one firm will be able to dominate in all 
areas. But that will not necessarily prevent 
attempts to control certain key interfaces. The 
policy implication is that standards and protocols 
should be kept open, transparent and reliable to 
permit new entrants to offer products and services 
on the market. 
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Conclusion 
Ubiquitous Computing signals a new phase 
of the digital economy. It will create new markets 
for ICT products and services. Unlike some 
ICT markets, such as PC systems, Internet 
infrastructure and e-commerce where US firms 
are relatively dominant, European firms are in a 
strong position to contest these markets. Also, the 
gains from this new avenue are open to traditional 
industries as well as the high technology sectors. 
But there are many unresolved questions. It 
seems that Ubiquitous Computing will move 
ahead quickly in areas where there are effective 
system integrators, such as in portable systems 
and automobiles. But in the potentially very large 
markets for consumer appliances and home 
automation the progress is likely to be slower and 
difficult. No system integrators have so far 
emerged, and this raises uncertainty for 
information appliance suppliers and consumers. 
The policy issue is to analyse and raise awareness 
about the industrial opportunities and challenges. 
There may also be a need for anticipatory 
measures to support innovation in traditional 
sectors gain through innovative leadership. 
It seems likely that interoperability will emerge 
through the adoption of standard "small footprint" 
operating systems which are being tried out in 
portable devices, mobile phones and consumer 
electronics. Given the variety of applications and 
players one system is unlikely to dominate, but 
certain critical interfaces may be subject to 
proprietary standards. The very variety of 
applications and the current fragmentation of 
markets makes it hard to monitor emergent 
dominant positions. Although common standards 
are needed, given that ubiquitous computing will 
continue to evolve, an early move towards fixed 
standards risks a sub-optimal technological lock-in. 
Timing is all. At least some key interfaces should be 
kept open to allow the free development of 
technology, markets and industry, j f 
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Pharmacogenomics: Personalized 
Drugs and Personalized Medicine 
Thomas Munker. IPTS 
issue: Pharmacogenomics, the combination of genetic testing and drug development, 
promises new approaches to illness prevention and drug design that will enable health-
care providers to pre-check whether a patient will respond well to a drug or will suffer 
from side effects. Pharmaceutical companies will be able to sharpen the profile of their 
drugs - drugs mav become more personalized. 
Relevance: As with other technologies where individual genetic data are handled, for 
example genetic testing for inheritable diseases, the privacy of such data needs to be 
assured. The goal of tailoring therapies to the genetic make up of certain groups or even 
of Individuals should not lead to the exclusion of others. The risk is that drugs are 
adapted to the most common genetic profile creating classes of patient that are 
'genetically right' or wrong. On the other hand, the precision of genomics and the 
possibility of identifying populations of good responders may make the approval of 
drugs for rare diseases easier. 
introduction 
M odern drug development is a complex process. The first step is the identification of a promising molecular target for drug action. This requires screening of the 
innumerable possibilities suggested by gene 
sequencing efforts, for example by the Human 
Genome Project. Validation aims to test the link 
between a target sequence and specific diseases. 
Then there is the need to clarify how the activity 
of the target sequence is regulated, its 
physiological relevance and the interaction of the 
products for which it codes. Advances in 
genomics (the systematic analysis of an entire 
genome) will eventually enable the identification 
of the genetic principles of most pathological and 
non-pathological phenotypes'. It will also 
redefine the understanding and traditional 
definitions of diseases. 
As the tools for identifying and understanding 
diseases become more sophisticated and precise, 
more specific treatments will clearly also have to 
be offered. Drugs that are precise enough to 
address a single gene within a gene-family need to 
be developed, otherwise 'sledgehammers are 
created instead of the lasers that are needed' 
(Cooke, 1998). 
Pharmacogenomics aims to explore whether 
patients will respond to new drugs, and how. It 
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aims to bridge the gap between gene discovery and 
drug development, and it is immediately appi ¡cable 
to clinical studies of existing drugs. The rapid 
growth in information and technology are 
stimulating enormous progress in this field (Lin, 
1996). One important outcome of research in this 
area is the development of diagnostic tests that help 
identify the appropriate drug for a given individual. 
The benefits of such tests are obvious: Patients 
avoid risky, painful and often extended 
investigative procedures to find the optimal 
treatment methods. A rapid test helps avoid 
harmful side effects. The systematic discovery and 
analysis of genetic variety in drug response should 
also lead to more cost effective drug 
development. Given that 80% of the compounds 
fail in clinical trials and industry spends $500-700 
million for each new drug approval, considerable 
benefits may be reaped (Housman, 1998). 
Prescription based on a precise and rapid 
instrument for disease identification could also 
reduce treatment costs. "With this advancement 
in molecular technology and the financial 
implications of the results obtained, genotyping of 
patients before prescribing certain drug therapies 
is likely to become routine" (Prows, 1998). 
The American National Institute for Health has 
already launched a $36-million programme to 
detect single nucleotide polymorphisms, so-called 
SNPs2, which can be used in characterizing drug 
responses, disease susceptibilities, and to study 
population genetics (Stix, 1998). 
New Therapeutic Approaches 
Most therapeutic drugs undergo a biotrans-
formation process that takes place, for example, 
in the liver. Typically, in a one or two-phase 
process, enzymes transform the lipophilic drug 
molecules to a more water-soluble metabolite, 
which usually represents the active form of the 
drug. These metabolites are then further 
metabolized and eliminated from the body. 
This idealized pathway, as it depends on the 
activity of biocatalysts, is determined by genetic 
parameters. Small differences or mutations in the 
genetic make-up, so-called polymorphisms, can 
cause modifications in the enzymes they encode. 
These modifications can subsequently be 
responsible for altered enzyme activity; the 
genotype determines the phenotype. 
Three different drug-response phenotypes 
have been described (Johansson, 1993). 
• Extensive metabolators, which represent the 
'normal' population, 
• Slow metabolators, which show little or no 
ability to metabolize a drug, and 
• Ultra-extensive metabolators, which 
metabolize a drug far quicker than the 
'normal' population. 
Both slow metabolators and ultra-extensive 
metabolators show abnormal concentrations of 
drugs and their metabolites in their blood 
plasma. Those who are not able to metabolize 
these can accumulate high, possibly toxic, 
doses. The ultra extensive metabolators usually 
show no clinical response at all because of their 
tendency to eliminate drugs from body before 
they can take effect. 
Biochemical tests can examine the patient's 
phenotype. But these tests, which determine the 
metabolization ratio of a test drug, are complicated 
and often they do not exclude the risk of an adverse 
drug reaction (Prows, 1998). External conditions, 
such as interacting drugs or the overall disease 
process, can influence and distort the test. 
Genetic tests can circumvent these problems. 
They do not try to detect the symptoms that are 
caused by a genetic alteration, they aim to detect 
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process, this information can be used to draw 
conclusions about the phenotype. 
A New Way for a Personalized Medicine 
For the time being genotyping is only used in 
research. However, many companies are 
developing genetic tests for pharmacological 
purposes. In his review of the clinical implications 
of drugs based on genetic differences David Prows 
from the University of Cincinnati estimates that 
genotyping will become an accepted tool within 
the next five years (Prows, 1998). 
The possibility of genotyping patients in order 
to estimate the risk of adverse drug reactions 
could pave the way for a more patient-centred 
health care model. Methods and tests developed 
by pharmacogenomics will make it possible to 
identify groups of patients that will react positively 
to drugs prescribed to them. Disease-relevant 
drug-targets will be identified and used "to 
develop extremely efficacious, broadly tolerated 
drugs that can be prescribed to the largest possible 
population. New pharmaceutical products 
could be marketed alongside a corresponding 
diagnostic test kit, so as to permit the selective 
prescription of the drug" (Housman, 1998). 
Together with new developments in protein 
analysis, where simultaneous assays of thousands 
of analytes will be possible, new integrated 
approaches in diagnostics can be foreseen. New 
fabrication technologies and progress in 
automation wil l support developments in 
diagnostics. Miniaturization and micro-fabrication 
technologies will make this new type of biosensor 
suitable for automation or even for implantation 
into the human body. The latter will enable on-line 
monitoring of high-risk patients. In order to detect 
the tiny differences in the human genome, which 
are responsible for diseases or variability in drug 
response, micro-chips, so-called SNP-chips will 
soon be on the market. They will definitely "mark 
the beginning of a personalized medicine" 
(Schmidt, 1998). 
It is estimated that between 1.6 and 4.2 billion 
dollars are spent each year in the United States for 
additional treatments to deal with adverse 
reactions (Classen, 1997), and that they may have 
caused over 100,000 deaths during 1994 
(Lazarou, 1998). Genetic tests would enable the 
physician to avoid some of these risks and so treat 
patients more effectively. Tests of this kind can 
also ensure patients have more information 
available to help them to make decisions affecting 
their health. Such technologies and procedures 
wil l circumvent long-term trial-and-error 
measures and may reduce costs and risks 
tremendously. Patients could be checked before 
or even while a new drug is being administered. It 
may therefore strengthen the role of primary care, 
as more accurate diagnosis may reduce the need 
to consult experts. 
In the US such targeted healthcare models 
have been predicted for 2008, (Poste, 1998), these 
include: 
• genetic and pharmacogenomic profiling, to 
identify people at risk of developing serious 
illnesses because of their genetic predisposition 
• diagnostics, to complement and support 
genetic tests 
• smart cards for storage of patient information 
• database applications for research, development, 
and clinical care, 
• counselling in clinical genetics 
• pro-active disease management protocols for 
prophylactic therapy, lifestyle modification, 
and monitoring. 
Although this model seems to be closely 
tailored to the US health market, some parts may 
also apply to some European health-care 
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systems. Biotechnology, micro- and nano-
technology, and information technology will 
drive new developments in diagnosis and 
treatment of disease. 
However, despite the promising beneficial 
trends forecasted for the area of pharmacogenomics 
and the ability to personalize treatments and drugs, 
some concerns have been raised. Too sharply 
focused drugs and therapies may detract from the 
goal of medicine and pharmacy to find treatments 
for as many people as possible: pharmacogenomics 
should not be used to pinpoint the people who are 
'genetically right' for the drugs pharmaceutical 
companies want to sell (Schmidt, 1998). 
Such a trend would be worrying. It could be a 
source of new "rare" diseases,3 and possibly lead to 
"therapeutic discrimination" against patients with 
diseases and genotypes that are expensive to treat. 
Other experts, however, argue that these fears 
are unfounded. They reply that both human 
genomes and diseases are polymorphic enough to 
make such a development unlikely to happen. 
The development of niche products for these 
markets could be an interesting and challenging 
market for SMLs given an appropriate intellectual 
property rights framework. 
In the USA, patient pressure resulted in the 
Orphan Drug Act in 1983, to stimulate the 
development of orphan drugs, which cannot be 
developed economically by industry without 
incentives. In 1999, the European Parliament 
approved, at the first reading, the proposed 
European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal 
Products, which might be implemented by mid 
2000 in the EU Member States. Because of the 
emphasis on rare diseases, a larger number of 
orphan drugs will result, but in addition the 
genetic origin of a number of more common 
diseases will be better understood. 
Ethical, Legal and Social implications 
The information produced by pharmaco­
genomic tests, while potentially valuable for 
medical treatment, may also be used out of 
context in ways that are contrary to the interests of 
the patient. The interests of health-care providers, 
which - with best intentions - want to produce 
personalized and evidence based medicine, may 
be counter to those of the insurance companies, 
which want to reduce their risks. The risk is a 
genetic discrimination against people who, while 
currently healthy, may be genetically predisposed 
to various diseases. For example, Paul Seymur, of 
the Faculty and Institute of Actuaries in Great 
Britain, is concerned that a successful test for 
Alzheimer's disease could create an "uninsurable 
underclass" (Financial Times, 1997). 
The ability to screen the genetic profile and 
the predisposition of humans to certain diseases 
caused by environmental or work related 
pollutants, for instance, raises the question of 
the confidentiality of these data and of the 
possible duty to disclose it to life insurance 
companies or other third parties. The two 
examples given below show that the 
communication even of initially harmless 
information may ultimately have far-reaching 
consequences: 
• Some people are known to be "slow 
acetylators". Slow acetylators show an 
adverse drug reaction towards certain 
anaesthetics used in surgery. The adverse 
reactions can be severe or even fatal. For 
patients and physicians a genetic test 
determining the risk of an adverse reaction 
therefore is a very helpful and potentially 
life-saving tool. But at the same time 
insurance companies may be interested in 
the test results. "Slow acetylator"-women are 
known to have - under certain conditions -
an increased risk of developing breast cancer 
(Schmidt, 1998). 
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• Genotyping for the "apoE-gene" gives another 
example of this kind of cross-implication. The 
"apoE-gene" encodes a protein that is involved 
in the metabolism of cholesterol. The uptake 
and the adequate metabolism of cholesterol is 
directly related to risks of cardiovascular 
diseases. Testing for apoE genotypes therefore 
has diagnostic significance for their detection, 
particularly in the risk assessment of coronary 
artery disease. However, there is also some evi-
dence that carriers of a certain apoE allele have 
a higher risk of developing Alzheimer's Disease. 
To know or not to know 
The two examples show the kinds of conflicts 
that may emerge in the near future. Pharma-
cogenomics will definitely help us to sharpen our 
medical and pharmaceutical tools. Drugs will 
become more precise and efficient, the risk of toxic 
side effects will be reduced. But at the same time 
increasing amounts of information will be collected 
which may be put to a variety of uses. As shown 
above some 'disorders' which seem to have 
nothing in common on the phenotype level are 
strongly interwoven on the genetic level. It is 
therefore possible for patients to become aware 
inadvertently that they harbour a gene which may 
have future consequences for their health. This is 
compounded by the fact that the information will 
not only affect patients' own lives, but also those of 
their relatives. Thus the person affected may be 
forced to decide whether they should be told. 
Patients may wish to keep the test information 
secret, even if it is important information for 
relatives. Some people may find it hard to cope 
with this situation and may need properly-trained 
professional help. 
Education and Training 
The rapid pace of developments in this area is 
making it hard for education and training of 
health-care professionals in genomics to keep 
pace. Lack of experience and competence in 
understanding the clinical implications of 
genomics may pose serious threats to the 
successful introduction of these new technologies 
(Poste, 1998). 
Educating health-care professionals about the 
implications and the potential impact of 
(pharmaco-)genetic testing is of tremendous 
importance in order to ensure the proper 
evaluation of the data retrieved and to avoid 
malpractice and misuse. Taking for granted that 
genetic testing for diseases and physiological 
characteristics will increase, the need for more 
specialized doctors and genetic counsellors, is 
obvious. But, the role of genetic counsellors needs 
to be defined. Their task could be to examine the 
value of a test in a particular case and advise 
whether it makes sense and what information it 
may provide. They could then further analyse and 
evaluate the test results together with the experts 
from the testing laboratory or company 
(Euroscreen, 1998). The genetic counsellor could 
give advice and support to both physicians and 
patients. It could also be their function to prevent 
malpractice in both the application of tests and 
the handling of data. 
The latter is of tremendous importance for the 
acceptance of genetically based therapy. Trust and 
confidence in the new technology is crucial, as 
the emotionally-charged debates surrounding 
genetically modified organisms in agriculture and 
food production have shown. The subjective 
perception of risks and threats associated with a 
certain technology can be decisive. 
In order to avoid a backlash, protective 
measures and standards wil l be required to 
control the misuse of personal data and 
malpractice in testing procedures. Also, it will 
probably be prudent if patient profiling tools are 
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not commercialized prematurely and without 
rigorous validation4 (Poste, 1998). 
Conclusion 
Progress in genomics wil l lead to the 
development of various genetic tests applicable in 
medical practice. They will expanding the range 
of tools available to physicians and complement 
diagnostic methods. Pharmacogenomics will help 
to avoid the prescription of potentially toxic 
drugs, lead to more rapid diagnoses and enable 
the identification of more effective therapies. 
For policy makers, though, there are a number 
of crucial issues at stake in these developments: 
• Genetic privacy and confidentiality 
To safeguard the potential benefits of new 
genetic testing and to enable its optimal use by 
society, more education and information is not 
just helpful but essential. A broad social 
dialogue will be needed on how to implement 
these new developments acceptably, covering 
discussions about privacy and confidentiality 
issues. Clear policies and guidelines are 
needed to avoid the enormous potential of 
human genetics being squandered. 
Education and training 
In contrast to most laboratory tests performed 
in clinical laboratories on blood or other body 
fluids or tissues, genetic tests may require 
extensive counselling before and/or after the 
test. With the growing availability of tests, the 
need for well-trained genetic counsellors will 
Insurance and the disclosure of information 
The disclosure of genetic information needs to 
be regulated. A further major concern is the 
problem that in the future more, as yet 
unknown, conclusions may be drawn from 
today's test results. 
Equal access to genetic testing 
The availability of genetic tests for a variety of 
purposes will affect health-care costs. The new 
methods clearly imply additional costs for the 
funding system. The question whether the 
clinical utility of the information retrieved will 
be sufficient to justify additional payment 
needs to be addressed. Policy measures should 
ensure that the positive trend towards a 
personalized medicine for many does not lead 
to the social exclusion of others, β 
Keywords 
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Notes 
1- A Phenotype is defined as the outward characteristics resulting from the interactions between genes 
and environment. The Genotype is defined as the actual DNA characteristics that make up each 
attribute, (genotype + environment u phenotype). 
2-Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are single base pair mutations having a frequency of > 1 % in 
the human population. In the human genome between 6 million and 30 million SNPs at which variation 
can occur are estimated. 
3- Rare diseases have a very low frequency among population groups. Very often for economical 
reasons, no or almost no treatment is available. The majority of so-called rare diseases are genetic in 
origin, and many are caused by mutation of a single gene which, at this time, may or may not yet be 
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known. Of the remainder, it is becoming increasingly apparent that many of those eventually becoming 
ill do so as a result of a genetic predisposition. Over 5000 different rare disorders have been identified 
worldwide, and Europe, with its great variety of population groups, is home to a large number of them. 
4- The ultimate need for technical validation of genetic tests has already been subject of an article in the 
IPTS Report (IPTS Report 1999, Issue 35) Kristoffersson, U., Rosen, K-Ε., and Sorup, P., (1999) Promoting 
Equal Accessibility of Genetic Testing Services of High Quality in the EU Through the Development of 
European Standards, IPTS Report, 35: 23-28. 
References 
• Classen, D.C., Pestotnik, S.L., Evans, R.S., Lloyd, J.F., Burke, J.O., Adverse Drug Reaction in 
Hospitalised Patients, Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and Attributable Mortality; The Journal of 
the American Medical Association Vol. 126: 1997, pp 608-614. 
• Lazarou, J., Pomeranz, B.H., Corey, P.N., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized 
Patients - A Meta-analysis of Prospective Studies; The Journal of the American Medical Association, 
April 15, Vol. 279, 1998, ρ 1200. 
• Crooke, S.T., Optimizing the Impact of Genomics on Drug Discovery and Development, Nature 
Biotechnology Vol. 16 Supplement, 1998, pp29-30. 
• Lin, K.M., Poland, R.E., Wan, W.Y., Smith, M.W., Lesser, I.M., The evolving science of Pharmacogenetics: 
Clinical and Ethnic Perspectives, Psychopharmacol. Bull., Vol. 32,1996, pp 205-217. 
• Housman, D., Ledley, F.D., Why Pharmacogenomics? Why Now, Nature Biotechnology Vol. 16: 
1998, pp 492-493. 
• Prows, D.R., Prows, C.A., Optimization Drug Therapies Based on Genetic Differences: Implications 
for the Clinical Setting; AACN Clinical Issues, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp 499-512, 1998. 
• Stix, G., Personal Pills; Scientific American, Vol.: 10, 1998. 
• Johansson, I., Lundqist, E., Bertilsson, L., Dahl, ML., Sjoqist, F., Ingelmann-Sundberg, M., Inherited 
amplification of an active gene in the Cytochrome P450 CYP2D locus as a cause of ultrarapid 
metabolism of debrisoqurine, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci, Vol. 90: 11825-11829, USA 1993. 
• Schmidt, K., Just for you, New Scientist 1998, Vol.14., pp 32-36. 
• Poste, G., Molecular Medicine and Information-based Targeted Healthcare; Nature Biotechnology 
1998, Vol. 16 Supplement, pp19-21. 
• Financial Times, Nov. 7, 1998. 
• Ethics of genetic screening, Commercialisation - Topics For Reflection: EUROSCREEN, Issue 10, 
Autumn 1998. 
Contact 
Thomas Münker, IPTS 
Tel.: +34 95 448 83 19, fax: +34 95 448 83 26, e-mail: tomas.miinker@jrc.es 
ι IPTS-JRC - Seville, 1999 
Ν Ο . 3 8 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 9 T h e I P T S R e p o r t 
Technology options for the Kyoto 
Carbon Emission Targets and 
European Competitiveness 
A n t o n i o S o r i a , IPTS 
issue: under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU is committed to significantly 
reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 2010 with respect to 1990 levels. Cost efficient 
ways of fulfilling this target would involve the deployment of advanced energy 
technologies, whose costs are likely to be far from negligible. 
Relevance: The cost-benefit trade-off for the European economy heavily depends on the 
policies undertaken by other global actors. Under the appropriate circumstances, an 
overall climate-protection policy may be neutral vis-à-vis the EU comparative advantage 
situation, whereas, if improperly implemented, the EU carbon emission mitigation policy 
may lead to a severe deterioration in European competitiveness. 
Introduction 
E nvironmental concerns have progressively gained a prevailing role as a determinant of energy policy. Whereas in the past decades the main focus was placed on 
security of supply issues, the collapse of oil prices 
experienced in the 80s and the diversification of 
the primary energy mix of advanced economies 
have contributed to mitigating that problem. Back 
in the 80s, the energy sector started concentrating 
increasingly on the negative environmental effects 
of energy transformation and use. The first issue to 
massively involve the industry was the problem of 
acid rain, induced by imperfect combustion and 
impurities in fuels. Technology was, however, 
relatively quick to cope with the problem, at 
reasonable and fully affordable costs. The 
environmental threat that the energy sector has 
been facing since the early 90s, i.e. the global 
warming issue, is likely to prove far more difficult 
to solve. 
The problem of global climate change due to 
carbon dioxide emissions coming from fossil fuel 
burning represents indeed a clear disruption in 
environmental policies. First of all, global 
climate change is the first environmental 
problem that mankind has to face in a really 
worldwide context. Domestic policy measures 
(either command­and­control or market­based) 
were effective in the past at coping with local 
pollution problems. However, the characteristics 
of the climate change issue make it necessary to 
devise collaborative solutions involving all the 
countries of the world, via a (possibly) complex 
negotiation process in which the corporate 
interests of many actors will come into play, and 
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Global climate 
change is the first 
environmental problem 
that mankind has had 
to face in a really 
worldwide context. 
What is also new 
is that it is not 
amenable to end­of­
pipe approaches 
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Implementing 
strategies against 
global warming will 
undoubtedly place a 
greater burden on 
some actors than 
others. Reaching 
consensus Is 
complicated by the 
absence of a 
supranational 
moderator 
Table 1. Sectoral disaggregation of EU energy-related carbon emissions 1985-1996 
C02 EU Emissions (10001. of C02) 1985 1996 
Bunkers 
Conventional Thermal Power 
Central Heating 
Energy Branch 
Industry, of which 
Iron and steel industry 
Non-ferrous metal industry 
Chemical industry 
Glass, pottery & building mat. industry 
Transports, of which 
Road transport 
Air transport 
Household, Commerce, etc., of which 
Households 
Agriculture 
TOTAL (1000 t. of C02) 
88594 
893443 
32768 
127130 
625798 
202470 
15682 
100700 
104444 
585283 
499650 
61481 
733906 
520714 
39606 
3086923 
116598 
931495 
16660 
149305 
534605 
171990 
13818 
85976 
83669 
825401 
693975 
101863 
691586 
432829 
53591 
3265650 
Source: EUROSTAT Sirène Database. 
whose outcome is far from being predictable. 
Second, given the very nature of the problem, 
which is not associated with by-products or 
impurities of production processes, but rather 
with the massive use of a given class of natural 
resources (fossil fuels that are the result of 
million years of carbon fossilization), technology 
can not provide end-of-pipe solutions. The 
(ultimate) engineering solution relies on a 
complete technology substitution process, which 
has to take place over a transition period, the 
duration of which will largely determine the 
magnitude of overall costs. Third, the time scale 
involved is so long and the natural processes 
involved are so little understood that an attempt 
at even the most approximate quantification of 
the damages (as well as mitigation costs) 
becomes a formidable task. The planet has 
certainly experienced climate change in the past 
as evidenced by geology and palaeontology, but 
never at the rate that seems likely to pertain in 
the case of man made greenhouse effects and 
therefore both impacts and possible mitigation 
options remain highly uncertain. Indeed it is the 
uncertainty itself which lies at the heart of the 
problem and gives a sense of urgency to the 
quest for a solution. 
The key sectors 
Benefits from climate change mitigation are 
likely to spread around most of the regions of the 
globe, positively affecting to some extent almost 
all economic sectors. The economic burden of 
carbon emission reduction would also reach all 
actors, but it is likely that the first shock would be 
concentrated on a few agents who would 
experience strong negative impacts before they are 
able to (partially) transfer it to other actors. Despite 
the fact that this situation is quite frequent in 
environmental economics, actors and sectors are 
in this case national governments (both from 
advanced and developing countries), energy 
multinationals, capital equipment manufacturing 
companies, and there is no supranational authority 
to moderate the consensus-building process. 
Under these conditions, the agreement on a 
coordinated policy to achieve an efficient and 
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equitable climate protection strategy is plagued 
with undesirable, suboptimal bifurcation paths. 
A cursory glance at table 1 indicates that road 
transport and conventional thermal power are the 
two sectors experiencing the fastest growth. This 
trend can be extrapolated to the rest of the world 
zones, albeit with reservations. Electricity demand 
is expected to increase by around 60% between 
1992 and 2010 worldwide. The baseline projection 
foresees an annualized rate of growth of 1.5% in 
the period 1992-2000, and of 3.4% for the period 
2000-2010. Within the developed economies, 
these rates of growth are lower: for the European 
group of OECD nations, the corresponding figures 
are 0.5% and 1.8%. The transportation sector is the 
second largest chapter in the carbon emission 
budget at global scale. As regards energy demand 
by the transport sector, it appears that advanced 
economies are reaching demand saturation. On the 
other hand, the growth in some emerging 
economies, such as China, the South/South East 
Asia and Latin America exceeds GDP growth. 
Looking at the global warming issue requires 
therefore a closer look to these two sectors, that 
Figure 1. C02 emissions worldwide 
together account for more than 50% of overall 
carbon emissions and whose aggregated weight in 
the global carbon balance is expected to increase. 
Technologies 
A baseline projection, including business-as-
usual hypotheses on technology improvements 
and efficiency gains and no carbon mitigation 
policies, as obtained from the world energy 
prospecting tool POLES indicates that world 
carbon emissions will increase from 6000 MtC 
in 1992 to 8200 MtC by 2010. Beyond this date, 
growth is expected to accelerate, reaching 
around 13000 MtC by 2030. Two facts must be 
noted here: first, the decline in carbon 
emissions induced by economic crisis in the 
Former URSS is expected to stop in the next 
decade. Second, the significant increase of 
carbon emissions from the Asian economies, 
noticeable even during the 90s. 
Full exploitation of technologies available 
today would permit the EU to go well beyond its 
Kyoto targets. These technologies include not 
only carbon-free (or less intensive) energy 
C02 Emissions 
2000 . . 
o 
s 
1500 
North OECD-EU OECD- Eastern F5UN South Asia SouthEast China Latin North Ainca Suosanahan 
America Pacific Europe Asia America Middle East Africa 
Zone 
Source: POLES baseline projection IPTS/IEPE. 
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Road transport and 
conventional thermal 
power already account 
for 50% of total carbon 
emission and are 
the two sectors 
experiencing the 
fastest growth, 
particularly in 
emerging economies 
Full exploitation of 
technologies available 
today would permit the 
EU to go well beyond 
its Kyoto targets. 
However, accelerated 
technology 
substitution is 
likely to be too costly 
for the available 
time frame 
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Taking the lead in 
climate protection 
may provide 
some comparative 
advantage over 
competitors in terms 
of accelerated 
adoption of cleaner 
and more efficient 
production modes, 
provided that the 
rest of the world 
follows suit 
conversion devices, such as renewables (wind, 
solar thermal, photovoltaics), nuclear, high-
efficiency gas-based technologies (combined 
cycle, fuel cells), but also in efficiency improving 
devices in the demand side (double glazing, heat 
accumulators, industrial cogeneration, etc.). 
However, the dimension of the infrastructures to 
be replaced and the magnitude of the' costs 
incurred in the case of accelerated technology 
substitution make this a highly improbable 
response within the available time frame. 
Indeed, climate change mitigation costs heavily 
depend on the time frame adopted to reach a 
given target, since an early motion towards a less 
carbon-intensive technology portfolio 
significantly reduces the overall costs. Two main 
caveats have to be considered when analysing 
the roie of technology in climate protection, 
though. On the one hand, enhanced (cleaner 
and cheaper) energy technologies do not ensure 
per se lower carbon emissions, since they could 
imply lower energy prices and therefore may 
induce an expansion in demand, with uncertain 
results in terms of total carbon emissions. An 
appropriate set of economic accompanying 
measures has to be set up to obtain the full 
results from an accelerated technology 
substitution policy. On the other hand, the same 
technology has different efficacy under different 
circumstances and in different places. 
The analysis of several energy technology 
scenarios developed within the JOULE 
programme indicates, for instance, that an 
accelerated progress for clean coal technologies' 
(in terms of capital cost decline and increased 
energy conversion efficiency) could indeed 
induce larger carbon emissions from most of the 
countries in the world (with the singular exception 
of emerging Asian economies). 
The European Union has engaged itself as the 
champion of climate protection in the Kyoto and 
post-Kyoto forums. The market for energy 
technologies (and, in particular, for power 
generation technologies) is really huge. Demand 
for electricity is expected to grow world-wide at 
an annual rate of 2.3% over the next 20 years. 
This is equivalent to building a new 250 MW 
power plant every 3 days during this period, not 
accounting for replacement of existing power 
capacity. Taking the lead may provide some 
Figure 2. Power Generation Capacity in the EU and China 
OECD - EU Electric Power Capacity China Electric Power Capacity 
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comparative advantage with respect to the main 
commercial competitors (i.e. the USA and Japan) 
in terms of accelerated adoption of cleaner and 
more efficient production modes, provided that 
the rest of the economies (first the advanced ones, 
then the whole world) also eventually embark on 
this climate protection path. However, it is also 
quite likely that pursuing an aggressive carbon 
emission mitigation policy without similar steps 
being followed by the USA and Japan in the short-
term (say within the Kyoto time frame) and global 
coordination in the mid-long term (2030 and 
beyond) may represent significant costs for the 
European economy, the deterioration of its 
competitiveness and, in addition, induce little 
climate protection. 
Carbon emission reduction costs 
Estimates of the overall carbon emission 
reduction costs are, in general, difficult to obtain. 
There are a number of hypotheses behind every 
analysis, and there are caveats that have to be 
taken into account when considering the figures. 
Of course, the longer the time horizon, the more 
unreliable these estimates become. In addition, 
even for the relatively short-term horizon 
(typically for the Kyoto target at 2010), the 
modalities of implementation of carbon 
mitigation measures imply significant differences 
in the estimates. Achieving the Kyoto target 
through an effort which is evenly distributed over 
time seems to be definitely cheaper than 
attempting to reach the same objective via a 
heavily back-loaded effort, due to the 
intensification of the economic effort which is 
required to overcome the inertia of economic 
systems to rapid structural change. In the first 
case, the cost of Kyoto for the EU-15 may 
reasonably lie confined below 0.2% of the EU 
GDP, whereas in the second, the burden of 
fulfilling the agreement may represent as much as 
!%-1.5%ofGDPby2010. 
A standard way of measuring carbon emission 
reduction costs is to estimate the carbon tax that, 
maintained constant over the committing period, 
would induce the desired carbon reduction at the 
target time horizon. This equivalent carbon tax 
implicitly measures the flexibility of a given 
economy to shift towards not only a less carbon-
intensive energy mix but also to a lower absolute 
energy consumption. Notice that this assumes 
early commitment to hit the environment-
protection target. Within a sector analysis 
restricted to energy markets (even if on a cross-
territorial basis) it is clear that reaching any 
carbon emission reduction will imply a net cost 
(possibly properly captured by the proxy "carbon 
tax"). No additional assumption is made regarding 
the use of the income levied via this hypothetical 
carbon tax. Estimates obtained with the world 
energy model POLES seem to indicate that the 
cost of fulfilling the Kyoto protocol on a purely 
domestic basis would be around 100-150 US$/tC 
(1990 prices) for the EU and the USA (possibly 
higher for the latter), and above 200 US$/tC for 
Japan. These differences are of course due to the 
different consumption patterns, infrastructure 
endowment and primary energy mix. 
Needless to say, the heaviest burden will he 
sustained by sectors that are particularly energy-
intensive, notably power generation and 
transport. However, some of the price paid 
(mainly by the energy-related sectors) may be 
recycled via tax reform drawing from sectors 
which are likely to expand as a result of the C0 2 
abatement efforts (such sectors would typically be 
more labour-intensive). Furthermore if any 
revenues generated (from possible tax receipts or 
emission permit sales) could be used to address 
other prevalent distortions in the economy, the 
overall cost across the whole economic system 
could be markedly lower (the so-called double 
dividend of environmental protection policies). 
Table 2 shows the results obtained by Capros et al. 
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Achieving the Kyoto 
target through an 
effort which is evenly 
distributed over time 
seems to be definitely 
cheaper than 
attempting to 
reach the same 
objective via 
an escalating 
economic effort 
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Energy-intensive 
sectors such as power 
generation and 
transport are likely to 
bear the heaviest 
burden. Nevertheless, 
the revenues 
generated from 
taxes or permits 
could be used to 
address other 
distortions in 
the economy 
Carbon emission 
reduction will 
be achieved 
more economically 
abroad, via Joint 
Implementation/ 
Clean Development 
Mechanisms or via 
global carbon 
emissions trade 
(1998) using the multi-sectoral energy-economic 
model GEM-E3 in comparing the economic effect 
of a progressively increasing carbon tax designed 
to achieve the desired target by 2010 (-20% of 
carbon emissions over the baseline) for two cases. 
In the first one, the resources levied via the carbon 
tax are not recycled, whereas in the second case, 
they are employed to alleviate the labour taxes 
supported by the workforce (therefore inducing 
higher labour demand). 
There is, however, the possibility of achieving 
the carbon emission reduction abroad, in emerging 
economies where the same reductions would cost 
much less, either via joint Implementation/Clean 
Development Mechanisms or via global carbon 
emissions trade. In both cases, the crucial 
mechanism involves an accelerated technology 
transfer from OECD countries to emerging 
economies experiencing a rapid electrification 
process. Assuming an Annex 2 carbon emission 
bubble, i.e. allowing for complete and unrestricted 
joint carbon mitigation efforts within the group of 
countries subscribing the Kyoto protocol, results 
from modelling exercises indicate that the (joint) 
carbon emission mitigation could lie around 60-70 
US$/tC (1990 prices). Extending the carbon 
emission bubble to the entire world could pull the 
total Kyoto costs down below 20 US$/tC. These 
numbers, approximate as they are, give 
nevertheless an idea of the potential benefits from 
international collaboration, based only on direct 
energy-related costs, and, therefore somehow 
disregarding the potential gains that an adequate 
tax-recycling policy may create across the other 
economic sectors. The official position of the EU 
has been so far to conduct the bulk of the carbon 
emissions reduction domestically, in contrast to the 
USA position, favouring international trade and 
cooperation to achieve cost reductions. After an 
intense debate within the EU, an agreement has 
been recently reached so that at least 50% of the 
total European carbon emission mitigation effort 
shall be conducted within the Union, leaving room 
for flexible mechanisms for the remaining 50%. 
Conclusion 
One way or another, and as alluded to above, 
achieving Kyoto would necessarily imply higher 
energy costs, and this may harm the relative 
competitiveness position of European energy 
intensive and transport-intensive goods and 
services, unless similar measures are adopted by 
Table 2. Emission-constrained case: Kyoto target with no recycling and 
labour recycling (compared to the baseline) for the EU-14 aggregate 
CDP 
Employment (*) 
Exports (In volume) 
Imports (in volume) 
Intra-tradeEUH 
Energy consumption (volume) 
C02 Emissions 
NO TAX RECYCLING 
2001 
-0.03% 
-17 
0.01% 
-0.24% 
0.02% 
-0.55% 
-1.0% 
2005 
-0.38% 
-217 
0.03% 
-2.73% 
0.14% 
-6.46% 
-10% 
2010 
-1.10% 
-531 
0.08% 
-6.08% 
0.33% 
-14.24% 
-20% 
LABOUR -TAX RECYCLING 
2001 
-0.0% 
60 
-0.16% 
-0.08% 
-0.17% 
-0.54% 
-1.0% 
2005 
-0.18% 
645 
-2.09% 
-1.00% 
-2.13% 
-6.49% 
-10% 
2010 
-0.65% 
1460 
-4.9% 
-2.18% 
-4.99% 
-14.55% 
-20% 
(*) thousand jobs 
Source: Capros et al (1998). 
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the USA and Japan — the EU's main competitors. 
Free­rider behaviour on the part of the USA and 
Japan, or an operating mode in which they obtain 
their carbon reductions credits via (definitively 
cheaper) international co­operation/trade, 
whereas the Europeans attain their carbon 
emission reduction share via (expensive) domestic 
policies and measures could be highly damaging 
to many European energy­intensive sectors. This 
negative impact could be more serious if the 
domestic implementation of carbon emission 
abatement is not properly implemented, 
bypassing the possible gains from a double­
dividend cross­sectoral policy. 
The Kyoto protocol, however, is far from 
guaranteeing climate stabilization. This ultimate 
goal would require a sustained, coordinated 
world­wide policy during a long time span aiming 
at eventual sharp reductions of global emissions if 
greenhouse gas concentrations are to stabilize. 
The costs of achieving this would definitely be 
much higher than those corresponding to the 
Kyoto agreement (a first step towards the final 
goal), and are of course much more difficult to 
assess. They depend again, on the time frame 
adopted to achieve the objective: a continuous 
carbon mitigation effort, fully exploiting the 
complementarities between different countries 
and implementing careful energy planning for 
countries experiencing a rapid expansion in 
energy demand would yield lower overall costs. 
On the other hand, delayed action may induce the 
adoption of quasi­irreversible carbon­intensive 
electrification patterns in many cases, therefore 
hindering the stabilization of carbon emissions 
within a reasonable time frame, and accelerating 
the climate change dynamics. _¿^P 
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A situation in which 
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of their emissions 
reduction quota 
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clean development 
could be damaging to 
the competitiveness of 
European firms 
About the author 
Antonio Soria holds 
degrees in Energy 
Engineering and 
Economic Science. He 
earned his doctoral 
degree in Nuclear 
Engineering at 
the Universidad 
Politécnica de Madrid. 
Before joining the IPTS, he 
worked at the Spanish 
Ministry of Industry's 
research centre CIEMAT, 
and then at the JRC Ispra 
site. His main areas of 
interest concern energy 
technologies, natural 
resource management 
and energy economics, as 
well as the environmental 
impact of energy 
transformation and use. 
' IPTS­JRC ­Seville, 1999 
T h e I P T S R e p o r t N o . 3 8 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 9 
36 4 tf 
få 
Enlargement of the 
European Union (EU) 
to include the Central 
and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) Is 
one of the biggest 
policy challenges for 
the coming decade 
EU Enlargement: Some lessons f rom 
the "Scenarios Europe 2010" Project 
A n n a M i c h a l s k i a n d Gi l les B e r t r a n d , FSU 
issue: Enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) will not simply be a matter of new members having to 
converge on any existing 'European model'. 
Relevance: Concerted action will be needed on measures both related to the 
requirements of applying the union's body of law and to softer, but equally important, 
issues, such as social values, frameworks of governance, security and harmonious socio-
economic development. 
introduction 
E nlargement of the European Union (EU) to include the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) is one of the biggest policy challenges for the coming 
decade. Moreover, it will be taking place in a 
context of ever faster-paced technology-driven 
change. This process, as indicated by the findings 
of 'Scenarios Europe 2010', a major prospective 
exercise undertaken by the Forward Studies Unit 
of the European Commission (see box 1), would 
need to include some 'softer' factors on the 
political agenda for EU enlargement, such as 
values, inequalities, governance and regional 
stability in addition to the more conventional 
'hard' factors such as the legal transposition of 
the Union's body of legislation. These soft factors 
reflect both the specific political and historical 
experiences of the CEECs and their traditions, 
perceptions and symbols. Such legacies affect 
social values and expectations about the 
consequences of integration into the EU. 
Moreover, the CEECs are in a process of political 
and economic transition, taking them away from 
a system of centralized command economy and a 
Box 1. The "Scenarios Europe 2010" project: Reference of Study 
The aim of the "Scenarios Europe 2010" was to prepare five consistent and plausible pictures of the future of 
Europe. The scenarios were constructed based on a collective exercise involving more than 60 officials, 
representing 15 different directorates-general of the European Commission. Many dimensions were taken into 
account, as shown by the diversity of the themes covered by the five initial working groups: governance and 
institutions, social cohesion, economic adaptability, EU enlargement and the international context. The aim of 
the scenarios is to stimulate debate on the future of the EU. The Forward Studies Unit of the European 
Commission intends to publish the results of its "Scenarios Europe 2010" project shortly. 
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Box 2. The Five Scenarios and their Implications on EU Enlargement 
In Triumphant Markets, Europe is evolving towards a liberal market model following the US example by a 
drastic downsizing of the welfare state, in particular the social protection systems and social services. The 
EU focuses on the economic aspects of integration, in particular the Single Market, and reduces its most 
costly policies, CAP and the structural funds. In this scenario, the Union is in a position to enlarge very 
rapidly because national sovereignty is no longer threatened by political integration and only limited 
financial transfer is on offer for poorer candidate countries. 
In The Hundred Flowers, a major crisis of governance occurs in several member states (especially the 
largest). Faced with rapidly changing societies, national bureaucracies are unable to adapt and lose 
contact with day-to-day realities. The citizens show.a mounting mistrust towards political and 
administrative elites and revert to local and community level, adding to a growing political and economic 
fragmentation of Europe. Due to the political crisis, the enlargement process is interrupted after a first 
wave of accessions. The enlarged Union is unable to develop a coherent foreign and security policy. 
Incapable of exporting its stability abroad, the Union is put under pressure by new non-military threats, 
such as international crime, pollution of the environment, illegal immigration, and smuggling. 
In Shared Responsibilities, the European governments decide to push through wide-reaching reform of the 
public sector at all levels (local, regional, national and European) in order to calibrate administrations 
according to principles, such as transparency, responsibility, decentralization and subsidiarity. In 2010, 
the Union has been enlarged to include the CEECs, Cyprus, Malta and two EFTA countries. The EU is 
equipped with an efficient foreign and security policy, and is able to establish solid political partnerships 
with its neighbours on subjects of common interest (for instance, in the case of Russia, the fight against 
organized crime, economic stabilization and environmental degradation). 
After massive demonstrations of public discontent, in Creative Societies, a new red/green elite comes to 
power in Western Europe. It undertakes a radical reform of accounting, pension and tax systems, in order 
to take account to environmental and social concerns. The CEECs are perplexed by the social and 
environmental standards being imposed by the Union, which leads to political tensions — and slows 
down the enlargement process. The Union's preoccupation with internal problems leads it to 
underestimate foreign policy issues. Excessive concentration on short-term concerns may engender in the 
long run a failure of Europe's green and social experiment (if only because of the demographic imbalance 
with the rest of the world). 
Turbulent Neighbourhoods envisages an unstable regional context: the European Union faces a military 
conflict in its vicinity and has to equip itself rapidly with a common defence capability. Foreign policy 
and internal security absorb most of the political attention, and the Union (dominated by its big member 
states) plays a more "unilateral" and dominant role in the relations with its neighbours. The situation of 
severe regional instability drives a clear demarcation line between the most advanced CEECs which 
become members of the EU, and those candidate countries which are left outside which are caught in a 
spiral of negative socio-economic development and rising insecurity. In adopting a strictly defensive 
attitude, the EU delays internal socio-economic and governance reforms and fails to remodel the 
continent on new, more co-operative basis. 
single party monopoly of the state apparatus 
towards more flexible and responsive policy 
frameworks based on elected government, able 
to manage the process of national consensus 
building. They also have to meet more diverse 
security threats including the spread of organized 
crime networks, ethnic tensions and aggressive 
nationalism as well as managing the effects of 
globalization, rapid advancement of modern 
technologies on their societies. 
Changing values 
As the CEECs are now evolving into modern 
democratic market economies, they are shaping 
distinctive collective values systems based on their 
own historical and social experience and the needs 
and aspirations of their societies. In the context of 
economic and democratic development, it would 
be wrong to assume that the CEECs will simply 
follow -with a time lag- the same trajectory as the 
Western European societies from the 50s onwards. 
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Each scenario covered 
by the exercise 
highlights different 
aspects that will have 
an impact on the 
process of integration 
of the CEECs, indicating 
that a successful 
enlargement is not just 
about economic 
development but is 
a process of value 
shift and change 
Western Europe is marked by a diversity of values 
and patterns of social behaviour and the CEECs 
will add with their own experience and 
perceptions to this. And in some cases this will 
differ from what already exists in the present EU 
member states. 
The consequences of the divergences in the 
value shaping roots of social change were 
illustrated in the different scenarios constructed 
for the "Scenarios Europe 2010" (see Box 2). In 
the Creative Societies scenario the inability of 
established structures to respond to changing 
values and new perceived needs sparks off strong 
popular discontent and revolutionary reform of 
established structures and policies across Europe. 
To the CEECs, this red/green revolution seems an 
incomprehensible luxury. Sustainable growth and 
the abolition of social exclusion contrast with the 
drivers towards economic growth, personal gain 
and consumerism in the transition economies. 
While Western Europe begins to shed 'mass 
consumerism' in favour of 'mass customization' 
for many citizens of the CEECs the standardized 
products of mass consumerism are still an 
aspiration, because conspicuous consumption 
and display of brands remains a symbol of 
relative wealth. 
Similarly, the social solidarity and shared 
values that lead to a deep reform of governance in 
the Shared Responsibilities scenario stand in 
opposition to the currently lower degree of trust in 
fellow citizens and state authorities found in many 
CEECs. Shared values may also seem suspiciously 
reminiscent of the utopian dreams of the early 
20™ Century that were later usurped by repressive 
Communist regimes. The aspect of social security 
offered by the state in this scenario, however, is 
likely to respond to the concerns of those parts of 
the societies that most regret the disappearance of 
the institutionalized security and the ideology-
based prestige of the Communist past. 
By contrast, the personal gain and consumerism 
of the Triumphant Markets scenario have risen in 
the CEECs during the transition period and are 
likely to remain strong motivations for some time 
to come, with all the tensions such models contain. 
Similarly, the fragmentation in The Hundred 
Flowers scenario, accompanied by a strong distrust 
of 'the system' (administration and politicians) 
with a preference for community self-help, are 
features that can be observed in the CEECs. The 
scenario sees a reinforcement of regional identities 
and the simultaneous erosion of the traditional 
nation-state, both trends that may find supporters 
among the many ethnic and cultural minorities in 
the CEECs. But another face of a trend towards 
greater localism could be social fragmentation in 
the direction of public intolerance of "deviant" 
behaviour or "ethnic impurity". A development of 
public connivance with repressive security policies 
or institutionalized intolerance points towards the 
Turbulent Neighbourhoods scenario, in which the 
internal and external security situation is unstable 
for the whole of Europe. 
Each scenario covered by the exercise 
highlights different aspects that will have an 
impact on the process of integration of the CEECs, 
indicating that a successful enlargement is not just 
about economic development but is a process of 
value shift and change. 
The uncertainty of governance 
It is in the area of institutional capacity and 
governance of the enlarged Union that one of the 
major challenges of enlargement appears - a 
challenge of a broader importance since many EU 
member states themselves are experiencing a 
crisis of governance. The building of systems of 
good governance for the enlarged EU is 
dependent on a concerted approach to reform 
Europe's bureaucracies (at different levels) to new 
circumstances. 
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In the CEECs' context, the main challenge is to 
establish effective governance systems at all levels. 
All candidate countries have undergone 
decentralizing reform in recent years, but these 
efforts have had to go against a strong centralist 
tradition — and have sometimes been seen as 
running against the process of rebuilding 
statehood. As the scenarios indicate, a crisis of 
confidence could develop in a number of different 
ways throughout Europe. In The Hundred Flowers 
scenario, for instance there is an erosion of political 
legitimacy in a number of EU 15 states, with low 
vote turnouts, public distrust of political processes 
and a lack of capacity to engineer reform. 
In The Hundred Flowers scenario (and also 
Triumphant Markets and Creative Societies 
scenarios to some extent), the state loses its 
capacity to maintain the rule of law (both in 
present EU members and applicant countries). 
This paves the way to growing regional instability 
and the faster spread of soft security threats: 
environmental disasters, trafficking and smuggling 
of weapons, drugs, and people. By 2010, 
international crime could well exercise political 
leadership (either directly or indirectly) over 
several regions or states in the Union and its 
immediate neighbourhood. By contrast, Shared 
Responsibilities, the scenario where a successful 
reform of governance takes place, indicates how 
dynamic economic growth might be triggered by 
international coordination of industrial and 
training policy to release the full potential of ICTs. 
In an increasingly globalized context, the search 
for new international governance models assumes 
greater prominence. Various issues can only be 
tackled at this level, for instance, the 
environment, privacy and security on the Internet, 
the control of genetically modified organisms, 
regional stability and increasing inequalities. But, 
as international co-operation rises in importance, 
it cannot rely on weakened institutions at the 
European or national levels. In order to allow the 
international projects to go ahead, it is necessary 
to negotiate with robust and stable political 
systems and to avoid the spill-over conflicts that 
are inherent in unbalanced growth regimes. For 
these reasons, institutional capacity building in 
the transitional economies is a concern of all of 
Europe in order to ensure that they are able to 
apply effectively the EU legislation as well as new 
regulatory regimes that may be taken on the 
international level and that these measures are 
accepted by the public at large. 
Soft security: export stability or import 
instability 
The end of the Cold War dramatically changed 
the strategic landscape of Europe, and with it the 
nature and origin of security threats. The threat of 
organized war between states is now largely 
replaced by intra-state power struggles, often 
along ethnic lines. 
Meanwhile, organized crime is a rising 
stability threat across Europe, from smuggling of 
goods (drugs, cigarettes, harmful substances such 
as nuclear waste, arms etc.) to human beings and 
some forms of terrorism. Global phenomena like 
the increasing use of the Internet, international 
finance, freer communication and travelling and 
access to sophisticated technology, may permit 
organized crime networks to operate relatively 
undisturbed. The rapidly changing economic and 
political environment and the still relatively 
fragile institutional situation implies that some 
CEECs may be at substantially higher risks from 
threats ranging from terrorism, drugs abuse, 
information warfare and piracy, to abuse of 
intellectual property rights (such as bootlegging, 
illegal datamining and so on) and dubious 
portfolio investment in privatized state assets. 
In the Triumphant Markets scenario, the 
economic integration of a great number of 
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The policy Implications 
point to a need for 
structural co-operation 
to enhance regional 
stability between the 
current EU, the pre-
accession countries 
and third countries, like 
the pact on organized 
crime with the CEECs 
or the EU common 
strategy on Russia 
The pressure for 
expanding membership 
is not necessarily 
positive. Specific 
cooperation 
agreements might 
be more appropriate 
for some countries 
in the EU's 
neighbourhood 
than the rights and 
duties of full 
membership 
countries in the region and the prospects of a free 
market between the enlarged Union and Russia 
have been conducive to peaceful relations 
throughout Europe. However, a lack of political 
will and the absence of a strong policy framework 
result in looming soft security threats around 
2010. In the Shared Responsibilities scenario, 
political will and foresight offer greater stability. 
Here, the EU sets up 'partnerships' with 
neighbouring countries to the enlarged Union to 
address soft security issues. In The Hundred 
Flowers scenario, fragmentation and the érosion 
of the nation-state lead to diffuse and widespread 
instability in which heightened regional identities 
lead to occasional, often ethnically inspired, 
outbreaks of violence. In the Creative Societies 
scenario, the EU, inward-looking and absorbed by 
revolutionary zeal, fails to mount stable political 
and economic co-operation with the countries in 
the neighbourhood. In the Turbulent 
Neighbourhoods scenario, because of the failure 
of the EU to stem the rising tide of instability and 
tension, it has subsequently to resort to military 
action to restore peace. 
The policy implications point to a need for 
structural co-operation to enhance regional 
stability between the current EU, the pre-accession 
countries and third countries, like the pact on 
organized crime with the CEECs or the EU common 
strategy on Russia. Cross-border initiatives between 
regions (the EuroRegions) to improve economic 
prospects, social interaction and cooperation are 
also important to achieve stability, as are specific 
bilateral agreements (e.g. between customs, border 
police and home offices). 
The risks of a technical' approach to 
enlargement 
Since 1997, the process of integrating the 
current candidate countries into the EU is driven 
by their obligation to take over the "acquis" (the 
Union's body of law, procedures, political 
commitments and fundamental objectives). This 
approach, whilst necessary, omits important 
complementary dimensions to enlargement. It 
seems important to develop areas that are today 
characterized by a weak, diffuse or evolving 
acquis. For instance, where populations have 
already been hit hard by the transition from a state 
economy to the market economy, there may be a 
loss of confidence in the ability and commitment 
of the state to improving social conditions, and 
thus a disillusionment with democratic 
development. This is the downside of a "fast and 
loose" enlargement, such as in the Triumphant 
Markets scenario. The trend already apparent in 
the CEECs towards rising regional and socio-
economic inequalities may increase 
fragmentation along the lines of The Hundred 
Flowers scenario. Whilst, instability as illustrated 
in the Turbulent Neighbourhoods scenario might 
be the price of neglecting the geo-political 
dimension of enlargement, in particular for 
regions at the new southern and eastern frontier of 
the enlarged EU On enlargement, the Union as 
the strongest player in a wide triangle of the globe 
stretching from North Cape to the Sahara and 
from the Atlantic to the Urals will have to support 
this "neighbourhood's" transition into a strong 
bloc of democratic market economies. 
How to escape the in/out' dilemma 
Perhaps the most fundamental question for the 
EU is where enlargement should stop. The 
pressure for membership is not necessarily 
positive. Accepting members are not ready to take 
on, or do not fully understand the requirements of 
joining the EU (including the necessity to share a 
number of political, social or environmental 
values) could create tensions. Perhaps, instead 
some countries in the EU's neighbourhood could 
be satisfied with specific cooperation rather than 
the rights and duties of full membership. 
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A "neighbourhood policy" that is more 
consistent, comprehensive and well endowed 
than at present could be an alternative route 
forward. The Creative Societies scenario features 
a continent-wide policy platform 'from Russia to 
North Africa' to include an area of free trade and 
related policies, ranging from science and 
technology to transport, energy, exchange 
programmes. Such a pan-European partnership 
could be a way to resolve the in/out dilemma', 
especially by providing a graduated boundary to 
the EU, rather than an abrupt demarcation. 
Conclusion 
The arguments outlined in this article, based on 
the work on the project 'Scenarios Europe 2010', 
are provisional, and much work remains to be 
done to deepen the reflections on the future of the 
enlarged Union to firm up the ideas. Moreover, the 
express aim of the scenarios is not to provide firm 
conclusions and recommendations, but to act as a 
stimulus for extensive discussions both in and 
outside the Commission. 
Overall, though, insights do build up in the 
process of constructing scenarios. Also, 
enlargement cannot be isolated from broader 
developments. West and East are subjected to the 
same trends: globalization, demographic ageing, 
environmental pressures, rapid technological 
change, changing values, and the spread of 
organized crime. Enlargement processes are also 
affected by these trends and the consequences will 
alter the shape and nature of whole of Europe. 
For example, the scenarios warn that that 
technological change could be an important 
amplifier of underlying social and political 
processes. Especially, in the cases where there is a 
breakdown of traditional modes of governance, 
people will find alternative ways to express their 
opinions or to exit from national politics by 
engaging in local and interest based activities. 
These sorts of developments are clearly aided by 
the growing use of the Internet as a tool for political 
organization. But ICT networks can contribute to 
social and political disintegration, undermining the 
transparency and accessibility of public life or even 
becoming conduits for organized crime. 
The role of new technology as a broker of 
change, therefore, reinforces the point that 
successful enlargement and a stable and prosperous 
European neighbourhood calls for policy attention 
to "soft factors" alongside the technical and 
economic requirements for enlargement. 
On the other hand, value systems in particular 
will play an important part in the acceptance of 
the requirements of EU membership by CEEC 
citizens. There is a need to accommodate and 
recognize the legitimacy of the alternative values, 
albeit within a general framework of basic liberal 
rights and freedoms, democracy, the rule of law 
and tolerance and respect for other countries and 
peoples. Sensitivity is essential, enlargement 
agendas driven too much by economic 
considerations would risk overlooking important 
dimensions of earlier enlargements (e.g. the 
provisions of the welfare state, the rule of law, 
accountable and efficient administrations). This is 
all the more important, since the needs and 
aspirations (women's emancipation, active 
participation in the political process, non-
traditional social behaviour or multiculturalism) 
in these countries' may not be met by implicit EU 
policy frameworks, j f 
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A B O U T T H E I P T S 
The IPTS is one of the eight institutes of the Joint Research Centre of the EU Commission. Its remit 
is the observation and follow-up of technological change in its broadest sense, in order to 
understand better its links with economic and social change. The Institute carries out and co-
ordinates research to improve our understanding of the impact of new technologies, and their 
relationship to their socio-economic context. 
The purpose of this work is to support the decision-maker in the management of change pivotally 
anchored on S/T developments. In this endeavour IPTS enjoys a dual advantage: being a part of the 
Commission IPTS shares EU goals and priorities; on the other hand it cherishes its research institute 
neutrality and distance from the intricacies of actual policy-making. This combination allows the 
IPTS to build bridges betwen EU undertakings, contributing to and co-ordinating the creation of 
common knowledge bases at the disposal of all stake-holders. Though the work of the IPTS is 
mainly addressed to the Commission, it also works with decision-makers in the European 
Parliament, and agencies and institutions in the Member States. 
The Institute's main activities, defined in close cooperation with the decision-maker are: 
1. Technology Watch. This activity aims to alert European decision-makers to the social, economic 
and political consequences of major technological issues and trends. This is achieved through the 
European Science and Technology Observatory (ESTO), a European-wide network of nationally 
based organisations. The IPTS is the central node of ESTO, co-ordinating technology watch 'joint 
ventures' with the aim of better understanding technological change. 
2. Technology, employment & competitiveness. Given the significance of these issues for Europe 
and the EU institutions, the technology-employment-competitiveness relationship is the driving 
force behind all IPTS activities, focusing analysis on the potential of promising technologies for job 
creation, economic growth and social welfare. Such analyses may be linked to specific 
technologies, technological sectors, or cross-sectoral issues and themes. 
3. Support for policy-making. The IPTS also undertakes work to supports both Commission services 
and other EU institutions in response to specific requests, usually as a direct contribution to 
decision-making and/or policy implementation. These tasks are fully integrated with, and take full 
advantage of on-going Technology Watch activities. 
As well as collaborating directly with policy-makers in order to obtain first-hand understanding of 
their concerns, the IPTS draws upon sector actors' knowledge and promotes dialogue between 
them, whilst working in close co-operation with the scientific community so as to ensure technical 
accuracy. In addition to its flagship IPTS Report, the work of the IPTS is also presented in occasional 
prospective notes, a series of dossiers, synthesis reports and working papers. 
'IPTS-JRC -Seville, 1999 
The IPTS Report is published in the first week of every month, except for the months of January and August. It is edited in English 
and is currently available at a price of 50 EURO per year in four languages: English, French, German and Spanish. 
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ADIT - Agence pour la Diffusion de l'Information Technologique - F 
CEST - Centre for Exploitation of Science and Technology - UK 
COTEC - Fundación para la Innovación Tecnológica ­ E 
DTU ­ University of Denmark, Unit of Technology Assessment ­ DK 
ENEA ­ Directorate Studies and Strategies ­ I 
INETTI ­ Instituto Nacional de Engenharia e Technologia Industrial ­ Ρ 
ITAS ­ Institut für Technikfolgenabschätzung und Systemanalyse ­ D 
NUTEK ­ Department of Technology Policy Studies ­ S 
OST ­ Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques ­ F 
SPRU ­ Science Policy Research Unit ­ UK 
TNO ­ Centre for Technology and Policy Studies ­ NL 
VDI­TZ ­ Technology Centre Future Technologies Division ­ D 
VITO ­ Flemish Institute for Technology Research ­ Β 
VTT ­ Group for Technology Studies ­ FIN 
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